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1 INTRODUCTION 
The concepts of global civil society and global governance have gained remarkable 
popularity among political science academics and International Relation (IR) studies 
during the past decades. While these concepts are central for the theory and practice of 
international politics, they also remain widely contested and debated. Thus, in this thesis 
I aim to provide a better understanding of the role of civil society at the transnational 
level. To be precise, the focus is on European development governance and a particular 
process of formulating a new European Consensus on Development. Instead of evaluating 
the role from the perspective of the EU policies or effects caused by civil society groups, 
I will concentrate on the language used by civil society actors. The cornerstone of this 
paper is that theoretical illustrations are relevant from the perspective of real practices 
since 'concepts are not conceived apart from activities carried out in their name' (Buckley 
2013a, 204). 
Studying civil society is highly timely and the motivation to analyse the topic aroused 
from the increasing discussion of a shrinking civic space. During the past couple of years 
civil society organizations have expressed concerns on serious threats to civic freedoms 
in more than 100 countries (Civicus 2016). It has been claimed that an increasing number 
of states is adopting models of law that restrict the space for non-governmental 
organizations to operate (Amnesty 2015; KIOS 2015) while the importance of other 
development actors such as private companies has been emphasized in development 
policies (see for example Gronow 2016). However, intergovernmental organizations such 
as the EU have made commitments to foster 'a dynamic, pluralistic and independent civil 
society' and 'meaningful and structured engagement' with it (European Council 2012, 1). 
Therefore, it could be asked: why are there signs of a shrinking civic space even though 
the civic participation seems to be valued and supported at the transnational level?  
For many reasons, it is a perfect time to analyse this puzzle. At the beginning of 2016 a 
new 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) was launched by the United Nations (SDGs 2016).  This new agenda is aiming 
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to shift the whole development paradigm by its universal approach. Simultaneously, the 
EU is formulating guidelines for its development politics as the new European Consensus 
on Development is being drafted by the European Commission (EC). This new agreement 
will replace the previous Consensus made in 2005 and guide the directions of 
development politics of the EU and its member states for the following years. The process 
of formulating the new Consensus is also an opportunity for civil society actors to 
highlight their interests and influence on the policy-making.  
Traditionally, civil society has been described according to its relation to states and 
markets. Many of these illustrations are based on the local narratives and they concentrate 
on civil society actors working in national or regional contexts. The story gets more 
puzzling when one moves outside the territory of nation states. What is the role of civil 
society in global governance? Conceptualizations of global civil society (also referred as 
GCS) vary at least as much as the illustrations of its local cousin. Common for many 
divergent theories is that they cherish a great faith in citizen participation and its 
beneficial consequences in global governance. Theories suggest that global civil society 
increases accountability, plurality and democracy, and thereby the whole legitimacy of 
global governance (McKeon 2009; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004; Scholte 2011a). Many 
theories explicitly emphasize the normative value of the GCS and its ability to create a 
global harmony (Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003). However, critical voices have also appeared 
in the academic level and European civil society groups have been accused of lacking 
accountability, representativeness and inclusiveness (Kutay 2012). In consequence some 
question the whole being of global civil society (Chandler 2007; Chandler 2009).  
However, my aim is not to further argue whether there is a global civil society or not, but 
to examine what it is. It has been claimed that it is due to the over-optimistic beliefs of 
transformative possibilities and lack of critical perspective in general, that the meaning 
of the concept has been obscured (Buckley 2013b; Lipschutz 2007, 304). Thus, in Global 
Civil Society and Transversal Hegemony Karen Buckley (2013b, 64) claims that there is 
'a significant lacuna in research between the philosophical promise and empirical reality 
of global civil society' and a re-conceptualization of the phenomenon should be made. 
Ronnie Lipschutz (2007, 304) then argues that despite the wide range of studies on GCS, 
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they rarely ask the important questions of why does it exist or what social role does it 
have. Many have agreed that more empirical evidence and systematic research on civil 
society participation on the global level is needed (e.g. Bergesen 2007; Buckley 2013b; 
Heidbreder 2012; Patomäki 2007). 
This thesis aims to contribute to filling this research gap with a critical approach on global 
civil society; and hence examine its conceptualizations in European development 
governance. Many of the theories of global governance are based on the idea of 
coordination and collaboration of different actors at the global sphere (see for example 
Commission on global governance 1995; Karns & Mingst 2010; Thakur &Weiss 2010). 
Yet, these approaches leave little space for the existence of power. Therefore, this thesis 
is based on a multifaceted nature of power and governance which is well captured in 
Power in Global Governance by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005a). 
According to the authors (Barnett & Duvall 2005a, 3) 'to understand how global outcomes 
are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained requires a 
consideration of different forms of power in international politics'; thus, they identify four 
types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. From this 
perspective, global civil society is also part of the wide web of power relations and 
'enmeshed with practices of governmentality' (Lipschutz 2005a, 247). Thus, I suggest that 
the roles of civil society actors in European development governance are rather in line 
with the neoliberal order than opposing it. Yet, how do the traditional conceptualizations 
of global civil society match the empirical evidence and how civil society actors position 
themselves in the governance structures? 
Instead of looking for the answers solely from external factors such as restrictions of 
states and rising nationalism, this thesis focuses on the internal characteristics of civil 
society groups and the language they use. The primary data is based on the reactions of 
civil society actors during the European Commission’s open consultation regarding the 
new Consensus on Development. This consultation process was centred around an online 
public consultation, held between 30 May and 21 August 2016. The data was collected 
directly from the Commission’s Your voice in Europe web page, which manages the open 
consultations. Since the method for analysis chosen for this thesis is better suited to 
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smaller units, I will concentrate on the reactions of one specific NGO network, the 
European confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (Concord). To form a 
profound understanding of how the network took part in the Consensus process, other key 
reactions from the consultation period are also included in the data set. This material was 
gathered from Concord’s official web page. 
The language is examined with a social constructivist approach and analysed with critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). The social constructivist approach acknowledges that 
knowledge, concepts and the whole reality is socially constructed (see for example Wendt 
1999) which goes hand in hand with the presuppositions of discourse analysis. In general, 
discourse analysis presumes that the reality is built on social interaction, where language 
has a special significance and by studying it, we can also explore the surrounding society. 
Also Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 3) argue that analysis of power and governance should 
include a consideration of the normative structures and discourses that generate social 
identities and capacities. Furthermore, according to Norman Fairclough (2003, 207) 
discourses illustrate our world as it is seen, as well as the imaginaries of how it could or 
should be. Thus, in his thesis the empirical analysis will be conducted by Fairclough’s 
(see for example Fairclough 1992; 2003) three-dimensional framework, which combines 
textual analysis, analysis of a discursive practise and analysis of a wider social practice.  
On the grounds of the above discussion, the study is guided by the following research 
question: how do civil society actors participate in European development governance? 
To be able to answer the question, I need to perform certain tasks. Thus Chapter 2 
conceptualizes civil society in global governance and highlights the leading role of non-
governmental organizations. Chapter 3 presents the context of EU development 
governance and the modes of civic participation within. Chapter 4 frames the 
methodological orientation by describing the method, data and limitations of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 firstly maps the reactions of civil society actors in online consultation in order 
to see what kind of actors participated in this process. Secondly, the reactions of Concord 
will be analysed by using Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. Thirdly, the findings 
will be interpreted in the light of existing studies. Finally, chapter 6 concludes the key 
findings of the thesis and discusses their relevance. 
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2 CONCEPTUALIZING CIVIL SOCIETY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
In this chapter I will structure the theoretical framework of civil society in global 
governance. Firstly, I will briefly present both traditional and more critical approaches to 
global governance. In this thesis governance is seen as inherently linked to the notion of 
power, and thereby the critical perspective is stressed. Secondly, I will turn into the 
concept of global civil society (referred also as GCS) and the characteristics of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  
2.1 Contested definitions of power and governance  
Global governance is not the same as having global government. It has also been stated 
that governance is not the same as politics, although the concepts are closely related; 
whereas politics is about competition in the pursuit of particular interests, governance is 
about producing public goods (Thakur &Weiss 2010, xv). Thus, Thakur and Weiss (2010, 
5) insightfully ask '[w]hy are there nonetheless elements of predictability, stability, and 
order despite the absence of a world government?' 
Along with globalization the concept of global governance has become a popular 
phenomenon in political science and a topic of a considerable amount of academic papers 
and studies. However, the concept of global governance is not free of contestation, and 
there are diverse ways of defining it. Yet when used with 'precision and vigilance' it can 
be a highly relevant for contemporary politics (Scholte 2011a, 10).  It is generally agreed 
that the end of the Cold War in 1990s increased the involvement of diverse actors in 
global affairs and deepened the integration between them. In consequence, the world is 
more interconnected and interdependent than ever before. Thus, it is a result of neoliberal 
paradigm shift in international political and economic relations that by 'privileging of 
capital and market mechanisms over state authority created governance gaps that have 
encouraged actors from private and civil society sectors to assume authoritative roles 
previously considered the purview of the State' (Jang, McSparren & Rashchupkina 
2016,1). It has also been claimed that it is the complex reality and growing global 
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problems that are demanding global governance (Karns & Mingst 2010).  
The report Our Common Neighbourhood by the Commission on global governance 
(1995, 2) represents the traditional view of global governance by defining that global 
governance is 'the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affair’s' and 'a continuing process through which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken'. Global 
governance is compared to the governance at the local level, and the need for pursuing 
“collective will” is stressed. (Commission on global governance 1995.) In similar vein, 
Karns and Mingst (2010, 4) state that global governance is not a single entity, world order, 
or a simple hierarchy but 'a multi-level collection of governance-related activities, rules 
and mechanism, formal and informal, public and private' which they named as pieces of 
global governance. These descriptions give a neutral and almost power-free illustration 
of the state of world politics, as it would be a purely rational order of things composed by 
several actors of the sphere. 
More critical approaches to global governance recognize the defaults of these traditional 
views. From critical point of view, it could be asked who is governing and what? Who is 
benefitting from the created rules and structures, and who are the losers of the game? And 
most importantly, what is the relation between power and governance? This thesis is 
engaged with these critical approaches to governance, and has absorbed the plural notion 
of power. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly define what is meant by power. However, 
this is not a simple task, since in political science power is an essentially contested 
concept and there are disagreements of what power is, how it operates, and how it changes 
(Gallie 1956 cited in Barnett & Duvall 2005b, 41). Thus, there is no single answer to what 
power is. Nevertheless, the way we understand the concept, matters greatly since many 
theories of power are at the same time theories of society and they portray a surrounding 
reality in very different ways. Guzzini (2005, 513–515) states that defining power is 
already a way of using it. 
And indeed, in political science the versions of power have varied from the Dahlian-
realist one (see for example Dahl 1957), to more nuanced illustrations (see for example 
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Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan 1998; Lukes 2005). These versions 
vary from direct and visible forms to more invisible and diffused impressions. In line with 
the latter conception, French philosopher Michel Foucault (see for example 1982; 1995; 
2007) believed that power is multidimensional and that governance can be defined as a 
systematic and persevering usage of power. According to Foucault this notion of 
governmentality forms the basis of all political thinking and operation, and should not be 
seen in simplified terms only as methods of certain institutions (Miller & Rose 2010, 44–
45). He also decentralizes power and in his view power is part of a wide network of 
discourses where knowledge and power are closely interweaved with each other (Hardy 
& Leiba-O'Sullivan 1998.) Thus, knowledge is not a neutral description of the truth, but 
another form of exercising power.  
Also Barnett and Duvall (2005a; 2005b) have recognized the need for a more pluralistic 
notion of power by claiming that disciplinary discussions in International Relations are 
too focused on realist versions and direct forms of power. They state that 'to understand 
how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and 
constrained requires a consideration of different forms of power in international politics' 
(2005a, 3). In Power in Global Governance (2005a) they bring together variety of 
theoretical perspectives to examine how power is presented in world politics. They 
identify four forms of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. 
Hence, it is not just the simple forms of power that matter, since only together these 
different dimensions are able to form a complete theory. In short, compulsory power 
refers to more direct control over another, involving specific actors. This form is related 
to the realist version of power. Institutional power is more indirect and diffused through 
for example specific international institutions. Structural power is again more direct but 
'concerns the social capacities and interests'. Finally productive power is both diffused 
and 'working in the level of social relations of constitutions'. This means that productive 
power produces subjects by creating meanings and significations. (Barnett & Duvall 
2005a.) Therefore, power and governance are 'inextricably linked' and global governance 
is not just a mechanical coordination of international politics, but also a distribution of 
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different values and ideologies such as democracy, human rights and liberalism (Barnett 
& Duvall 2005a, 13).  
This kind of approach to global governance automatically raises a question of who are 
the actors, the ones holding the power and benefitting from the outcomes? It has been 
suggested that despite the many defaults of nation states, they are not disappearing but 
adapting to the new context of governance (Castells 2008, 87). Yet, the modern state-
centric Westphalian system of global governance has moved towards a more diverse 
composition that has not replaced the states but stretched the boundaries by including new 
issues and actors in the sphere (Thakur &Weiss 2010, xvi–xvii). For example, Karns and 
Mingst (2010) list several important actors from states to non-governmental organizations 
and inter-governmental organizations to multinational corporations. In less critical point 
of view, states and their sovereignty are likely to remain in the centre of global 
governance, while international institutions are helping to build cooperation and shared 
goals (Thakur & Weiss 2010, 3–4). However, in this thesis the traditional description of 
global governance is challenged by more critical view, which gives an opportunity to 
examine the participation of civil society actors from a critical standpoint. Civil society 
participation is examined in the context of the European Union, which is one of the most 
well-known intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the world.  
As many other concepts in world politics, also IGOs are referred and defined in several 
different ways. In this thesis I use a definition that describes them as 'organizations that 
include at least three states among their membership, that have activities in several states, 
and that are created though a formal intergovernmental agreement such as treaty, charter, 
or statute' (Karns & Mingst 2010, 5). Today’s most powerful IGOs were created in 
aftermath of the Second World War, and since that the number of them has significantly 
increased (Gutner 2016). This is also true concerning on the EU, and in the following 
chapter I will contextualize this background more carefully. Yet, here I still want to 
further clarify why states create IGOs in the first place. Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst 
(2010, 7) itemise multiple functions that these IGOs offer for states: analysing data, 
creating forums for exchanging views and decision-making, defining rules and allocating 
resources to name but a few. However, these institutions have also the ability to restrict, 
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set agendas, pressure governments and facilitate the creations of rules and norms for them 
(Karns & Mingst 2010). Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore (2005, 161) argue that 
it is often thought that globalization and complex reality of international relations requires 
IGOs to manage and perform diverse functions, but this might not be their only incentive. 
Thus, while international institutions are seemingly producing common goods through 
collaboration, they also employ compulsory and institutional power with their authority 
and productive power by shaping subjectivities and meanings of political phenomena 
(Barnett & Finnemore, 175). Even more pessimistic description of power politics and 
anti-thesis for liberal institutionalism claims that structures of all institutions are designed 
by 'the winners' of the system and just 'help mitigate the regimes losers’ destructive 
ambitions' (Gruber 2005, 102–103). Hence, instead of a neutral and equal system of 
arranging global issues, global governance is a web of power relations and some are able 
to gain more than others. 
Global governance has not been able to bring peace and harmony to the world, and for 
many ways it has failed to create coordination and cooperation between different actors. 
Meanwhile global inequality is growing and according to Oxfam statistics eight men own 
the same wealth as the 3.6 billion people who make up the poorest half of the world 
(Oxfam 2017). Yet, despite of all its shortcomings global governance is most likely not 
going to disappear. According to Jan Aart Scholte (2011b, 342) even more global 
governance is needed in the future, but since it needs to be truly accountable, civil society 
should be a central part of it. In a similar vein, Karns and Mingst (2010, 29) note that 
even though 'power relation of states matter, so do the resources and actions of non-state 
actors', and above all, three key challenges of legitimacy, accountability and efficiency 
should be considered while building the structures of global governance. Also Jang et al. 
(2016) believe that in the near future individual empowerment gains more momentum 
and along with it the influence of civil society is expected to grow. 
2.2 In search of global civil society  
In this thesis my purpose is not to sum up the diverse conceptualizations of civil society 
and then produce a single complete one. Moreover, my aim is to explore the traditionally 
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used conceptualizations in order to analyse how civil society is described today and why. 
Especially, I want to address the “globality” of civil society, and thus use the notion of 
global civil society instead of mere European civil society. These conceptualizations are 
not important only for understanding the historical trajectory, but as Buckley (2013b, 239) 
well describes; the way we put names and labels to objects, impacts also the identity 
constructed and actions pursued. 
As the whole framework of global governance, also the notion of global civil society has 
multiple and contested definitions (Scholte 2011a, 33) and the illustrations of it have 
varied from 'civic-consensual' to more 'radical activist' representations (see for example 
Buckley 2013b; Castells 2008). In practice none of these illustrations are as 
straightforward as they might sound. In point of fact, taken out of the context global civil 
society is a generic term that is used to describe very different kind of things. Therefore, 
it is always important to define what is meant by the concept and how it is understood 
(Lipschutz 2007, 304). The fact that most theories of global civil society are based on 
narratives of local civil society makes the concept even more confusing. Yet, it is difficult 
to get pass this logic, and as indicated in the previous subchapter states still have a 
significant role in global governance. 
Perhaps the biggest academic discussions considering civil society are about where it is 
located, whom or what it includes and what kind of normative presuppositions it 
inherently has. What has generally been agreed is that civil society lies more or less 
outside the official government and the private sector, which makes the notion of 'third 
sector' to come alive (Scholte 1999, 3). This notion includes a spectrum of civil society 
actors from labour unions to religious communities and social entrepreneurs to diverse 
civil society organizations. Yet, according to Scholte (1999, 4) the concept of civil society 
should also be defined through its reasoning and attempt to shape policies, norms or 
deeper social structures because 'civil society exists when people make concerted efforts 
through voluntary associations to mould rules: both official, formal, legal arrangements 
and informal social constructs.' In similar vein, Bob Reinalda (2001) concludes that non-
governmental organizations are emerging as a special set of organizations that are private 
in their form but public in their purpose. Besides placing civil society outside of family, 
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market and state, these definitions give certain normative presuppositions for it. Thus, it 
appears that many theories emphasize the normative value of civil society and its ability 
to create a global harmony (see for example Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003). According to 
Mary Kaldor (2003, 583) a historical review shows that despite its changing content, the 
concept of civil society has been based on the same core meaning and an idea of a social 
contract among individuals.  
Location of civil society is closely linked to the debate of what it is. Traditionally civil 
society has been portrayed at least in two divergent ways: on the one hand as a 
transformative actor resisting the status quo, and on the other hand as an open space for 
communication. The former could be described through Gramscian theory. For Antonio 
Gramsci civil society was located between state and market and represented the Polanyian 
double-movement against the self-regulated markets (Buckley 2013b; Lipschutz 2007, 
304). This approach stresses the role of civil society as a counter-hegemonic movement 
and sees it as a so-called 'post-modern prince' contesting the power of empire and neo-
liberalistic hegemony and common-sense (illustrated in Buckley 2013b). In other words, 
civil society is seen as a contender, a movement of resistance, not completely separated 
from state but acting as its consent and aiming to alter the power of markets. For some it 
is due to the over-idealistic expectations, that global civil society literature has not been 
able to properly historicize the concept of civil society, and therefore it still makes an 
artificial division between the public and the private realm (Lipschutz 2007, 304). 
The later expression can be described with the Habermasian critical theory, which is 
based on normative presuppositions of communicative action and defines civil society as 
an establisher of free public sphere outside of the state and economic organizations 
(Patomäki 2007, 314). In other words, it is a network for exchanging information and 
points of views that lies between the state and society (Habermas 1996, 360). This public 
sphere would be the means to a more transparent and legitimate system, and thus more 
separate from a state than in the Gramscian notion. A quality of dialogue is important 
aspect of public sphere thematic and it contains promises of consultation, deliberation and 
partnership (Fairclough 2003, 80). Thereby Fairclough lists several normative feature that 
effective public sphere dialogue needs to have: 
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a) People decide to enter dialogue, and can continue the dialogue on other 
occasions; 
b) Access is open to anyone who wants to join in, and people have equal 
opportunities to contribute to the dialogue; 
c) People are free to disagree, and differences between them are recognized; 
d) There is a space for consensus to be reached, alliances to be formed; 
e) It is talk that makes a difference – it can lead to action (e.g. policy change). 
Kaldor’s (2007, 300) definition is close to the public sphere but gives more emphasis on 
politics and agency. It also gives a great historical review of the concept: 
Like the public sphere, the medium through which individuals negotiate a social 
contract has changed over time and this explains the changing empirical definitions 
of civil society. Over time, free public spaces get institutionalized and debate and 
negotiation move to new arenas. Thus, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
debates about public affairs took place in coffee houses and were reflected in 
parliamentary debates, which is why civil society at that time referred to a rule-
governed society based on a social contract. In the nineteenth century, the spread of 
capitalism created autonomous spaces in the economy and debates involved the 
emerging bourgeois – hence for Hegel, and his definition was taken up by Marx, 
civil society was equated with bourgeois society. And in the twentieth century, the 
rise of workers’ movements and the emergence of mass political parties further 
narrowed the definition of civil society, at least according to the main twentieth 
century ideologist of civil society Antonio Gramsci, to the realm of culture and 
ideology. 
Thus, even though civil society has been located outside of the private sector and states, 
it is still inherently linked up with a territorial state. According to Kaldor (2003) this link 
between state and civil society was broken in 1970s and 1980s when the concept was 
simultaneously used in Latin America and eastern Europe to oppose militarized regimes 
and advocate the change from the below. Kaldor continues by stating that the notion of a 
global civil society aroused around 1990s. The emergence of these “islands of civic 
engagement” was made possible by the international links and the existence of 
international human rights legislation. Hence, the new conceptualizing of civil society 
became a global one. (Kaldor 2003, 583–587.) However, in the light of the theories of 
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global governance the role of states is still a central one at the global sphere, and therefore 
the concept of global civil society cannot be truly separated from nation states. 
A forum discussion on Theorizing Global Civil Society in Globalization (2007) gives a 
good sum up of the discussion. In his article Deriving Norms from Global Space: The 
Limits of Communicative Approaches to Global Civil Society Theorising David Chandler 
(2007) argues that just by being global and distinct from states, global civil society 
assumes a moral importance, and makes the idea of global public sphere mere idealist 
veil for political projects. His core claim is that global civil society is defined by the 
universal norms rather than real life actors, and thus the whole concept is lacking 
empirical evidence (Chandler 2007). Chandler (2007, 296) states that: 
International civil society NGOs may be disingenuous when they argue that they 
advocate on behalf of the environment or those without a “voice”, but even these 
claims pale against the hubris of the liberal academics who claim to speak on behalf 
of “global civil society” as a whole when they reconstruct their own normative 
positions from their academic investigations of “global space”. 
Kaldor (2007) directly responses to Chandler by reminding that 'it was already Hegel who 
defined civil society as an ethical realm'. Fred DallMayar (2007) does not take the critique 
but recognizes a need for more pluralistic and open political culture. Also Lipschutz 
(2007) admits that the use of the concept of global civil society is incoherent, but claims 
that it does not mean that the phenomenon would not exist at all. Instead of taking the 
concept mere 'normatively attractive realm of non-state actors', it should be seen as a 
logical continuation of capitalist globalization (Lipschutz 2007, 307). As for Heikki 
Patomäki (2007, 314) who sees the potentiality of global civil society especially in 
democratizing the opinion and will-formation by stating that: '[c]ivil society is thus not 
necessarily outside the state or against the state, but can be turned to make a contribution 
to a transformation of what a democratic state is.'  
The general view on the existing theories on GCS shows that, as the framework of global 
governance has been stretched along with the rapid globalization, also the concept of civil 
society has been affected by the transition of world politics. The problem is that the 
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theories of global civil society are often based on the narrative of local civic participation, 
and an analogy of state, markets and private sector. Hence, the problem with many global 
civil society theories is that they focus on moral or political civil society in 'a global 
context where the rules and principles of representative democracy do not apply' 
(Patomäki 2007, 313). Instead of linking GCS to the nation states it should be seen as a 
part of neoliberal regime of governmentality and (quite unquestionably) global markets 
(Lipschutz 2005, 230). Lipschutz (2007) claims that global civil society is 'a central and 
vital element in an expanding global neoliberal regime of governmentality, which is 
constituted out of social relations within that regime and which, with and through the 
capillaries of productive power, helps to legitimize that system of governmentality.' 
It can be concluded that there is no single conceptualization of global civil society. Still 
common for many divergent illustrations is that they cherish a great faith in global civil 
society and its beneficial consequences in global governance. It has been suggested to 
increase accountability, efficiency, plurality and democracy in global governance; and 
thereby the whole legitimacy of it (McKeon 2009; Patomäki & Teivainen 2004; Scholte 
2011a). Yet, the expressions of the concept, have obscured its meaning and 
transformative possibilities rather than clarified them (Buckley 2013a; Buckley 2013b). 
It is agreed that more empirical research on the identification of global civic actors is 
needed (see for example Bergesen 2007; Lipschutz 2007; Patomäki 2007) and to do this 
its representations and interpretations should be studied (Buckley 2013b, 232). Eva 
Heidbreder (2012) crystallizes that research gaps remain deep in consequence of both the 
diverse conceptualizations of the phenomenon and the ambiguous role of civil society as 
either in opposition or support to the state.  
This thesis aims to contribute to fill this research gap by examining civil society 
participation from the critical global governance perspective. I have chosen to examine 
the European development governance and concentrate on more organized forms of civil 
society, and namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This of course limits my 
perception and might exclude some important elements of civil society participation. Also 
the prefix of “global” often seems disconnected and misleading. Since this paper treats 
EU politics, it could be more straightforward to refer to European civil society. However, 
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the Union is taken as a significant global actor and it is clear that the prospective 
Consensus has a global focus. Thus, it is justified to address global civil society instead 
of a European one. It also seems that in this context more organized forms of civil society 
are dominant. Therefore, this study focuses on NGOs and the radical activist versions that 
operate far from policy-making are left outside of the scope. Yet, I presume that this does 
not narrow the vision too much, but leaves room for potential resistance and opposition. 
In a following subchapter I will present the specific features of organized civil society. 
2.3 NGOs as dominant civic actors 
NGOs are loosely defined as non-profit voluntary organizations with social, political or 
environmental goals. They have operational purposes as they provide services to 
communities, supervise interests of certain groups as well as have a role in advocating 
different issues. (IR Online 2016.) Kaldor (2003, 589) relates NGOs to so called 
neoliberal paradigm of global civil society that is based on Western traditions. As shown 
in the previous subchapter, many conceptualizations of civil society stress its 
democratization effect. Yet, it should be acknowledged that reforms advocated by civil 
society actors are not self-evidently transformative and democratizing, as they can be 
conservative in a sense that they only aim at advocating their personal interests (Patomäki 
& Teivainen 2004, 7). However, it is believed that because of the globalizing nature of 
world politics the value of public support generated through civil society will be 
emphasized in the future (Kaldor 2003, 590) and new opportunities for NGOs to influence 
will increase (Trommer 2011).  
NGOs are by definition located outside the governments and operating independently of 
them. Yet, many NGOs receive a partial government funding which makes them more or 
less reliable of the government policies. This also applies to international NGOs that 
receive funding from the EU. Pallas, Gethings and Harris (2014) argue that international 
NGOs are often criticized for failing to represent and engage with the grassroots 
stakeholders, but many explanations concentrate on external factors such as financial 
pressures that arouse from donor interests. They claim that what has been lacking is the 
examination of the effect of internal characteristics of international NGOs and the ways 
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they justify their being. This paper is particularly interested in these internal 
characteristics and self-identification of civil society groups, even though it is 
acknowledged that is impossible to completely separate those from external factors.  
According to Kaldor (2003) NGOs are more involved in the official processes and 
negotiations than for example social movements (which Kaldor links to activist 
paradigm). A strong involvement in the political processes also raises questions of the 
independency of these actors. On the other hand, as Didier Caluwaerts and Min 
Reuchamp (2015) have stated more independent political projects of civil society often 
lack output legitimacy since by being outside of the system they are also fail to create any 
binding commitments for the official decision-makers. However, institutionalization and 
increased number of professionalized civil society groups again emerge accusations of 
the genuine representativeness of them (see for example Kutay 2012; Kutay 2015; Pallas 
et al. 2014). In their article Representation Beyond the State: Towards Transnational 
Democratic Non-state Politics Teivo Teivainen and Silke Trommer (2017) state that more 
attention should be paid to the question of representation of non-state actors in 
transnational level. The authors use a general description of representation and define it 
as 'making present in some sense what is nevertheless not literally present' (Pitkin 1989, 
142 cited in Teivainen & Trommer 2017, 19) and claim that representation is always 
“speaking for other”. 
This discussion of representativeness is also linked to the North-South divide, and the 
problem of Western dominated agendas. Previous studies show that there has been 
instances in which international NGOs located in the global North have been neglecting 
the concerns of their Southern partners, and thereby reinforcing the pre-existing 
imbalance in global order (Pallas et al. 2014, 1263). Also Teivainen and Trommer (2017, 
28) recognise this problem and conclude that 'denying the relevance of representation in 
non-state collective decision-making may hide and reproduce power structures'. This 
highlights the necessity to examine the participation of civil society actors from a critical 
perspective. In the following chapter I will scrutinize the participation of non-
governmental organizations in the context of European development governance. 
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3 CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT GOVERNANCE 
Here I will portray European development governance by setting the EU development 
politics in the framework of global governance presented in the previous chapter. I will 
start by briefly outlining its normative basis, and then turn into the EU decision-making 
processes regarding development politics and civil society participation. However, the 
European Union (also referred as the EU or the Union) is taken more as a context, and 
the civil society as the actor in the spotlight. Thus, the main purpose of this chapter is not 
to explore the EU decision-making per se but to further conceptualize global civil society 
by focusing on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their participation in the EU 
policymaking.  
3.1 Normative basis of EU development politics 
The EU is a significant actor at the sphere of global development politics. It claims to be 
the world’s leading donor in official development assistance (ODA) by giving almost half 
of the world’s development aid (European Commission 2016a). Yet, this figure consists 
both the EU institutions and its member states, which blurs “who” the EU actually is. In 
practice the Union is not a single actor, but a complex set of institutional arrangements 
acting in cooperation with the member states. However, it is one of the most powerful 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the world and has the ability to make rules and 
exercise power also within its member states. The Union has also significant 
subranational characteristics and by revising of the basic Treaty provisions, the member 
states have given some of their sovereignty to the central institutional structure (Goebel 
2013). 
In this thesis it is not possible, or even purposeful, to describe the institutional background 
of the Union in its full length. Yet, it is relevant to acknowledge that there is a long and 
colourful history behind the entity. In short, the foundation of EU, the European 
Economic Community (EEC), was established in the aftermath of the Second World War 
in 1958 with the aim of securing peace and cooperation (EU 2016). Thereafter the Union 
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has expanded from six fairly homogenous countries to a group of 28 very heterogeneous 
states. And of course the historical roots of Europe reach beyond the 20th century. 
Especially regarding to the development politics it is necessary to recognize the vestiges 
of colonialism. Past relationships are still represented in the arrangements between the 
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific group. According to Himadeed Muppidi 
(2005) global governance involves “a politics of difference”, and the objects of global 
governance carry a special burden in helping to reproduce a colonial order. Therefore, 
EU development politics is claimed to be essentially neoliberal and promoting Western 
governance practices (Hout 2010). 
Yet, in his article Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Ian Manners 
(2002) claims that in consequence of its normativity, the EU differs from the other great 
powers. Manners (2002, 252) wanted to picture the Union from the view point of norms 
rather than power and emphasized its ability to change the definition of what is referred 
as “normal” by stating that 'the most important factor shaping the role of the EU is not 
what is does or what it says, but what it is.' Later Manners (2009) further clarified his 
notion of normative power, and claimed that new global challenges required the EU to 
use its normativity. Within this normativity Manners included the core Western liberal 
values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. From this perspective it 
seems that the values promoted by the Union would somehow be more neutral and 
untouchable than the ones promoted by other empires. Even though this notion has faced 
criticism, it has nonetheless had considerable impact on the studies of European foreign 
policy (Diez 2005, 77).  
In this thesis the notion of power is highlighted as the EU is set in the framework of global 
governance. Besides it is acknowledged that the operative development politics is 
traditionally linked to foreign, security and trade policies – and thus not separate from 
many external and internal interests and incentives. Thus, it is taken for granted that 
power relations reach all parts of global governance, and also the alleged normative 
intentions. In her dissertation Inside the European Consensus on Development and Trade: 
Analysing the EU’s Normative Power and Policy Coherence for Development in Global 
Governance Marikki Stocchetti (2013, 267) has well captured the foundation of the 
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Union’s normative position and suggest that 'the EU’s normative role cannot be 
understood independently of the different forms of power that the EU may deploy in line 
with its material and immaterial interests.'  
Seeing that development politics is necessarily based on the view of what development is 
and how it is reached (see for example Koponen 2009), it is purposeful to discuss the 
normative basis of the Union – and whole European development governance. Critical 
voices remind that even colonialism was once justified by humanitarian grounds and 
intentions to “civilize” the other (Rist 2002, 55), and also language of human rights can 
be seen as “the ideological gloss” of the dominance of Western world (Douzinas 2007, 
7). Even though in this thesis I will not go more deeply into this discussion, it should be 
acknowledged that the principles of development politics are not given, but have certain 
historical and ideological roots based in Western traditions. On this ground it is essential 
to evaluate the reasoning of European development governance more critically.  
3.2 Decision-making and participation  
Herein, I will outline the most relevant institutional actors considering the EU 
development politics and the role of civil society within.  The European Commission 
(EC) proposes new issues and implements development policies, and is also responsible 
for the process of formulation the new Consensus on Development. Besides the 
Commission, other important organs are the European External Action Service, the 
European Parliament (EP), the European Council (The Council) and the Council of the 
European Union. The figure 3.1 shows how the roles are divided. 
EU’s development politics is guided by both international treaties and general agreements 
of the Union. The legal basis for European development policy was established in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), and a more specific policy mandate for European development 
cooperation was structured in the Commission’s Development statement in 2000 (Henölk 
& Keijzer 2016). In practice, EU policies on development are based on the Lisbon Treaty 
(2007) and the European Consensus on Development. Lisbon Treaty sets the legal basis 
and main objective of 'the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty' 
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(Article 208). The European Consensus on development (2005) then identifies the shared 
values, goals, principles and commitments for the Union, and is made jointly by the three 
main EU institutions: Commission, Parliament and Council.  
 
Figure 3.1: The most relevant institutional actors in the EU development politics. 
Source: adapted from Donor tracker http://donortracker.org/donor-profiles/european-union/actors-decision-making  
 
In a way the Consensus is a statement of past records and future intentions, and provides 
common policy guidelines for EU development policy at the national, bilateral and the 
Community level (Stocchetti 2013, 168). At the same time, it is an expression of EU’s 
development discourse and 'reinforces the power that the EU and its member states are 
using in the field of international development' (Stocchetti 2013, 169). In 2012 this jointly 
made Consensus was updated by so called Agenda for Change with a more strategic EU 
approach to reduce poverty, including a more targeted and concentrated allocation of 
funding (European Commission 2016a). Yet, since the “old” Consensus is based on 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of United Nations, the new Agenda for 
Sustainable development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will broaden the 
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scope from poverty eradication to wider spectrum of global challenges (Henölk & Keijzer 
2016).  
Already a quick look at the Union’s complex institutional settings and a high stack of 
different treaties shows that the entity is rather far from an ordinary citizen. Even for a 
person well up on the matter it might be difficult to perceive the bureaucratic decision-
making structure. Therefore, it is not surprising that many observers claim that the Union 
lacks democratic representativeness and suffers from severe democratic deficit (Kröger 
2016, 7). In consequence, civil society organizations have been thought to democratize 
the EU and fix the democratic deficit in whole (Kröger 2016). To increase the level of 
democratic representativeness, the Union has been promoting a wider participation of 
civic actors. In the White paper on governance (2001) the Commission recognizes that 
civil society is a valuable partner in development and plays an important role in the 
development of Community policies. The Lisbon Treaty (2009, Article 11) takes into 
account the importance of broad consultations and 'an open, transparent and regular 
dialogue with representative associations and civil society', thus constitutionally 
legitimizing the involvement of civil society in European governance. And in the Action 
Plan on Human rights and Democracy (2015) the Commission and the High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, promote 
stronger partnerships between authorities and local civil society organizations, and also 
address some specific threats to NGOs space. It has even been stated that these policy 
initiatives and promotion of civil society involvement are signs of a new governance 
mode (Heidbreder 2012). 
The review of the EU documents indicates that global civil society has, at least on paper, 
an important role in the EU development politics. When reflected to the two 
conceptualizations illustrated in chapter 2 (i.e. a Gramscian counter-hegemonic 
movement of resistance and Habermasian public sphere), it seems necessary to add one 
more conceptualization to the picture. Heidbreder (2012, 7) states that besides these two 
definitions civil society can be described as 'a collaborator, constituent element and 
integrated player in political processes'. By reviewing literature on EU politics Heidbreder 
separates two dominant analytical perspectives for civil society participation: civil society 
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as organized actors in multi-level governance and civil society as proponents of European 
public sphere. First one relates to organized groups that represent specific interests, and 
can be taken as a participant and collaborator in policy-making or opposition to the state. 
Second perspective is drawn from normative assumptions of a public sphere and takes its 
theoretical ground from deliberation. These three conceptualizations also give differing 
democratizing functions to civil society and its participation. (Heidbreder 2012.) 
Yet, I have discussed the shrinking space and questioned significance of NGOs. In this 
more pessimistic approach, the provision of participatory democracy contained in the 
Lisbon Treaty has been criticized by arguing that the current debate surrounding civil 
society participation at the EU level is 'built on somewhat nebulous ground, both 
theoretically and empirically' (Kutay 2015, 817). Acar Kutay (2012, 29) claims that the 
involvement of the European NGOs has not legitimized and democratized the EU 
governance, and NGOs themselves lack accountability, representativeness and 
inclusiveness. In similar vein, Nora McKeon (2009, 2) states that giving voice to civil 
society does not necessarily create meaningful incorporation of these actors. Therefore, 
intergovernmental organizations might include civil society to the decision-making 
process simply to establish a good governance image.  
The problem could also be the governance system itself. For example, Beate Kohler-Koch 
(2010a, 112) claims that the multi-level EU system makes direct relations between 
represented and representatives difficult; thus the image of representation and reality do 
not match. Kohler-Koch states that although the Commission has stressed the legitimacy 
input of civil society the European NGOs remain distant from stakeholders and direct 
communication down to the grassroots level is marginal (Kohler-Koch 2010a). Thus, 'the 
promise of “involving civil society” has not bridged the gap between Europe and the 
people, but rather sponsored a Brussels-based CSO elite working in the interest of deeper 
integration' (Kohler-Koch 2010b, 335 cited in Heidbreder 2012, 11). However, civil 
society organizations have a contradictory situation since they need to be highly 
professionalized “Brussels-activists” and at the same time hold close relation to diverse 
national, regional and local stakeholder contexts (Heidbreder 2012, 11).  
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This critique is in line with the wider global governance literature. According to critical 
perception of global governance also global civil society is part of the system and not 
inevitably a democratizing vehicle. Among other interest groups and the private sector, 
civil society actors seek to influence policy-outcomes by advocating the EU institutions. 
In practice many civil society organizations have Brussel-based offices or belong to wider 
NGO platforms. These structural arrangements make participation of ordinary citizens 
more complex and leave the stage for professional NGO workers. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need for more studies on civil society participation in the EU. And with high hopes 
on the growing body of research Heidbreder (2012, 29) states:  
After more than ten years of EU initiatives aimed at democratizing the EU via civil 
society participation, and in the light of a growing body of scientific accounts that 
modify or disappoint high-flying hypotheses, reconciling the theoretical and 
empirical position of civil society within the logic of representative democracy 
highlights the outstanding research challenge in order to close the gap between 
theory, rhetoric, and reality about civil society participation in the European Union. 
Along with this statement and the theoretical and contextual background presented, I want 
to get back to the question of how do civil society actors participate in European 
development governance, and in this case in formulating the new Consensus on 
development. 
3.3 Summary of the theoretical chapters 
In previous two chapters I have discussed the theoretical framework of civil society in 
global governance and the specific context of European development governance. The 
theoretical discussion of global governance is mainly focused on the idea of cooperation, 
consensus and coordination, and is described as a rational answer to globalization, 
deepening interdependence and increasing number of global conflicts. The governance 
approach of the EU seems to follow this traditional description. However, by masking the 
existence of power, the system loses some of its core values such as accountability, 
legitimacy and democracy. Already by acknowledging the multiple forms of power, the 
hierarchical and unequal structures of governance could be realised and empirically 
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studied (Barnett & Duvall 2005a; 2005b). Thus, this thesis examines the EU development 
politics through the lenses of power and sees development governance as an inherently 
hierarchic and controlled system of Western liberalism. 
Similarly, many of the theories fail to relate global civil society to the notion of power 
and see beyond its normative promises. The diverse academic discussion show that global 
civil society is not a coherent entity. There are disagreements on its actor-space division 
and relation to states and markets and need for more empirical evidence is obvious. In 
this thesis I have chosen to concentrate on more organized forms of civil society, that 
excludes the most radical versions of civic participation. I have described three divergent 
conceptualizations: a counter-hegemonic movement, a collaborator and an open sphere. 
These conceptualizations also give differing democratizing functions to civil society and 
its participation. but there seem to be a shared vision that civil society is needed in global 
governance. Furthermore, as I explored the existing literature on civil society in global 
governance, I realized that the question of representation was a crucial aspect of civic 
participation.  
Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine how these conceptualizations match the 
civil society participation in the process of developing new European Consensus on 
development. How civil society groups position themselves in European development 
governance and in relation to other actors such as the EU and the private sector? What 
kind of arguments are made and who these groups represent? And what kind of power do 
these groups have? By answering these questions, I am able to further conceptualize the 
phenomenon of global civil society and strengthen the linkage between theory, rhetoric 
and reality.  
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4 METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
In this chapter I will review the analytical framework and data sources of the thesis. 
Firstly, I will justify the methodological points of departure, including social 
constructivist approach and the importance of language and discourses in social studies. 
The focus is on discourses, since even though this study pays attention to language the 
point is not to study linguistics as such. The core idea is that the way civil society actors 
speak also tells who they are. Secondly, I will present the specific data analysis methods, 
and outline Norman Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA). Thirdly, 
I will describe the process of data collection and detail the sample more specifically. 
Lastly, I raise certain limitations regarding the methodological choices taken. 
4.1 Analytical framework 
There is no single way to study reality and the world around us. However, plurality 
doesn’t mean that anything goes, and there are many variations and degrees to accomplish 
basic criteria of a scientific inquiry (i.e. systematic, public and worldly knowledge) 
(Jackson 2011). Yet, it is crucial to be consistent in the conduct of inquiry and 'stand in 
some specific place within the broad universe of scientific methodologies' (Jackson 2011, 
196). This thesis belongs to the field of International Relations (IR), and is engaged in a 
social constructivist approach and a qualitative case study design.  Here in, I will outline 
the analytical framework of the thesis in order to give a better understanding of where I 
stand in the research field. 
For a start, it is important to clarify the concepts of methodology, epistemology, and 
ontology, to explain how and for what purpose the research project is undertaken (Lamont 
2015, 24). On the epistemological ground, there are two broad traditions that give 
competing claims to what should be counted as acceptable knowledge: empiricism and 
interpretivism (Lamont 2015, 17). On the other hand, according to Patrick Thaddeus 
Jackson (2011) strict polarity between “hard science” and “soft interpretive approaches” 
is unnecessary, and has evolved unproductive debates within the field of IR. He claims 
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that the question and aporia should come first, and the puzzle should guide the selection 
of data and methods, not the other way around (Jackson 2011). In this case the research 
emerged from the dilemma that high hopes and over-optimistic conceptualizations of civil 
society seemed to be conflicting with the trend of shrinking civic space. My intent is to 
provide a better understanding of the role of civil society in global governance. Further 
conceptualization is important because these conceptual descriptions have actual effects 
to the actions produced. Since in this thesis the theoretical framework of global 
governance is based on the idea of multifaceted nature of power, also the analytical 
perspective needs to give room for various interpretations.   
Therefore, this study acknowledges the importance of ideas and identities, and not just 
the material forces. The claim of social constructivism is not that ideas (shared knowledge 
and culture) are more important than material interests and power, but that the latter 
presuppose ideas and are constituted by them. In other words, according to a social 
constructivist approach, knowledge, concepts and the whole reality is socially constructed 
(Wendt 1999). Yet, constructivism is not a straightforward theory of international politics. 
In this thesis constructivism is understood more as a reflexive meta-theoretical position. 
This means that the social world is not only a part of the real world, but might also affect 
it (see Cuzzini 2000).  
While social constructionism is an umbrella term for several theories of society and 
culture, discourse analysis (DA) is one of the most popular approaches within. Yet, 
discourse analysis is not purely a method for analysing data, and it should not be detached 
from its theoretical and methodological orientations. Thus, critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) contains ontological premises by seeing the role of language in the social 
construction of the world, certain theoretical models and methodological guidelines and 
finally specific techniques for the analysis. (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 4.) Solely the 
word discourse has many definitions, and there is no consensus of what it should mean 
and how it should be analysed. Yet, it can be agreed that discourse is 'a particular way of 
talking about and understanding the world' (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 1). French 
philosopher Michel Foucault has played a central role in developing the concept. The idea 
of Foucault’s early stage, so called archaeology of science (see for example Foucault 
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1972; 1976), was based on the notion that language has a central role in reproducing and 
transforming power relations along many different segments of society (i.e. class, 
sexuality, disability). Foucault believed that discursive processes and practices produce 
social identities; thus the use of language relates to the construction of the subject. 
In general, discourse analysis presumes that the reality is built on social interaction, where 
language has a special significance. Language is not only linguistic, but also a social 
activity. Thus, the basic idea of discourse analysis is that by studying the language, we 
can also explore the surrounding society. According to Fairclough (2003, 38) texts are 
part of social events, which are shaped by the causal powers of social structures, social 
practices and social agents. As Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips (2002, 9) explain: 
'[w]ith language, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a 
pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality.' This means that even though 
there is a certain reality and physical objects within, they get their meaning and value 
through a discourse (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002). In short, a discourse contributes to the 
construction of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and meaning 
(Fairclough 2003; Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 67). Therefore, discourse has three 
functions:  
1) identity function as it represents social identities,  
2) relational function as it constitutes social relations, and 
3) ideational function as it gives meanings to things. 
Discourse analysis however is quite a loose term for a number of approaches to analyse 
written, vocal or sign language. This paper follows the path of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). This approach is said to be critical in the sense that it aims to reveal also the 
discursive practices and unequal power relations, and thus contributing in the social 
change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 63–63). According to Fairclough (2013, 178) it is 
both normative and explanatory critiques, since it does not simply describe and evaluate 
existing realities but seeks to explain them. In other words, CDA wants to unveil implicit 
power relations and understand how meanings are created. Yet, CDA is not a coherent 
unit. It is both a wider approach within the field and a label that Fairclough has given to 
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his own more specific version. Fairclough’s (2003, 2) approach differs from other version 
of CDA as it is based on the assumption that language is dialectically interconnected with 
other elements of social life. So it views social reality as “conceptually mediated” and 
recognises that, the way social objects are seen, represented, interpreted and 
conceptualized, is part of their realities (Fairclough 2013, 178). Fairclough (2013, 124) 
describes that:  
I see discourses as ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, 
relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings 
beliefs and so forth, and the social world. […] Discourses not only represent the 
world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are also projective, imaginaries, 
representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in 
to projects to change the world in particular directions. 
Thus, language is not just a channel for information, but also a “machine” that generates 
and constitutes the social world. Besides uncovering the meanings, language constructs 
subjects and their identities. This means that 'changes in discourse are a means by which 
the social world is changed'. (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 9.) Yet, one of the core points 
of this paper has been that global governance – and the role of civil society within – 
should be examined through a pluralist notion of power. Thus it also should be 
acknowledged that concentrating on purely discursive power does not form a complete 
picture of power relations. Also Fairclough (2003, 2) admits that not everything is 
discourse, and CDA is just one way of seeing the world and 'an analytical strategic 
amongst many'.  
However, Fairclough’s approach is well-suited in the analysis of productive power, which 
refers to a discursive production of the subjects and fixing meanings or terms of action 
(Barnett & Duvall 2005a, 21). According to Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 3) '[a]nalysis of 
power, then, also must include a consideration of the normative structures and discourses 
that generate differential social capacities for actors to define and pursue their interests 
and ideals'. Similarly, Stocchetti (2013) uses CDA while studying the coherence of 
development policies of the European Union and previous Consensus on Development 
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made in 2005. Stocchetti shows that through the discursive means the EU reproduced and 
legitimized its own choices and agency in the field of development and trade.  
4.2 Applying Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis 
Now that I have briefly presented the methodological basis for discourse analysis, I will 
describe more in detail how I have applied Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse 
analysis. Fairclough (see for example Fairclough 1989; 1992; 1995; 2003; 2013) 
introduces three levels for the analytical framework for empirical research. Analysis 
should contain description of linguistic features of the text, interpretation of the processes 
relating to the production and consumption of the text and explanation and the wider 
social practice to which the communicative event belongs. In other words, each of these 
dimensions require a different kind of analysis: 1) textual analysis 2) analysis of 
discursive practice and 3) analysis of social practice. However, all these different 
dimensions then are interdepended and often analysed simultaneously. 
The first dimension of CDA contains detailed analysis of the text: its vocabulary, use 
of metaphor and rhetorical forms, its grammar and the relationship between sentences and 
the types of argument used. Also the way events and processes are connected with 
subjects and objects (transitivity) can be assessed. In other words, transitivity specifies 
how a writer represents who acts (who is the subject) and who is acted upon (who is the 
object). (Fairclough 2003.) According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, 83) 'All of these 
give insight into the ways in which texts treat events and social relations and thereby 
construct particular versions of reality, social identities and social relations'. (Jørgensen 
& Phillips 2002.) In practice, I for example analysed how choice of wordings express 
certain attitudes and social actors. 
The second dimension is discursive practice, that focuses on how the text is produced 
and consumed (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 81). According to Fairclough (2003) an 
order of discourse is a network of social practices that consists of three discourse-
analytical categories: Genre, Discourse and Style. He also introduces three major types 
of text meanings: Action, Representation and Identification. There is a correspondence 
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between categories, and genre relates to ways of acting, discourse to ways of representing 
and style to ways of being. (Fairclough 2003, 26–27.) In other words, genres are semiotic 
ways of acting and interacting such as job interviews, articles or poems that intrinsically 
contain certain rules and constrains (Fairclough 2013, 179). Similarly, discourses are 
identified with different positions and perspectives, and styles with certain identities such 
as “being a manager” or “being a worker” (Fairclough 2013). In the analysis first and 
second dimensions are treated together, as these two levels are dialectically 
interconnected and for example the choice of words and metaphors relates to ways of 
being. Discourses (ways of representing) differ from genres and styles since they are 
positioned and depending on the worldview of the observer (Fairclough 2003, 207).  
Discourses enable also subject positions for certain actors and give the voice for certain 
groups (Fairclough 1992).  
In this paper I am especially interested in styles and identification process of civil society 
groups. What constitutes civil society according to the text? How groups identify 
themselves and their relation to the nation states, the EU and the private sector? For 
Fairclough (2003, 159) styles are discoursal aspects of ways of being, and thus, who you 
are is partly a matter of how you speak or write. Fairclough (2003, 164) assumes that 
'what people commit themselves to in texts is an important part of how they identify 
themselves'. This commitment can be assessed by modality and evaluation of texts. 
Modality is about what is true and necessary, while evaluation describes what is good or 
bad, desirable or undesirable. In short, the way people commit themselves tells us how 
they are representing the world and since identities are relational, the way one represents 
the world also tells us who one is.  
Besides these categories CDA presupposes that the nature of social power and dominance 
is understood, because with that insight one can examine how discourse contributes to 
their reproduction (Dijk 1993, 254). Therefore, also the concepts of ideology and 
hegemony are highly relevant for the analysis. Ideologies are representations of different 
aspects of the world, and contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social 
relations of power, domination and exploitation (Fairclough 2003, 9). The notion of 
hegemony is not a black and white, since dominance often is associated with acceptance 
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and consensus, and thus many forms of dominance are “jointly produced” through social 
interaction, communication and discourse (Dijk 1993, 255). However, for Gramsci 
hegemony means social consensus that masks people’s real interests, and by creating 
meanings people can be mobilized (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 32). Other important 
concepts for the analysis are difference and assumption. Difference in texts relates to the 
question of hegemony and can be for example a 'salience or particular social identities' 
(Fairclough 2003, 40). Assumptions on the other hand are claims or presuppositions given 
in the texts, and while they are implicit meanings of the texts they contain existential, 
propositional or value positions (Fairclough 2003, 212).  
The third layer is social practice. Fairclough (2003, 205) states that social practice is a 
relatively stable form of social activity, that consist both discursive and non-discursive 
elements. Since the wider social practice also includes non-discursive elements, language 
cannot be understood or analysed in isolation from its social context and other texts 
(Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 69). According to Fairlough (2003, 128) texts often mix 
different discourses and set up dialogical or polemical relations between their “own” 
discourses and the discourses of others. This is called intertextuality or interdiscursivity. 
In a way it is one of the main purposes of the analysis to show the links between discursive 
practices and broader social and cultural developments and structures (Jørgensen & 
Phillips 2002, 78). Thus, it should be assessed what are the ideological, political and 
social consequences of the discursive practice, or does it reproduce or perhaps challenge 
the status quo in social practice (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 87).  In the synthesis chapter 
of the analysis social practices will be analysed by reflecting the findings from first two 
levels of analysis to the wider theoretical background. I will also try to connect texts with 
other texts, discourses and social practices to see where they get their legitimacy. 
In sum, analysing texts and conducting CDA includes a) looking at the three aspects of 
meaning (Action, Representation, Identification) and their realization in the grammar and 
vocabulary and b) making a connection between concrete social events and more abstract 
social practices by examining its genres, discourses and styles. Yet, these levels are 
“dialectically related” and therefore treated together. (Fairclough 2003, 28.) 
                                                               32 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Fairclough’s three-dimensional framework for analysing discourses 
adapted from Fairclough (1992; 2003).  
 
4.3 Data 
In this subchapter I will detail what kind of data was used, where it came from, and why 
this kind of data was chosen for the content of discourse analysis. First of all, the aim of 
this paper is to study civil society in the framework of European development governance. 
The revision process of the European Consensus on Development in 2016–2017 provided 
a topical and interesting case study to utilize. As it has been justified in chapters 2 and 3 
that in this context the role of more organized and civic-consensual agencies is prioritized 
over more activist-like representation, and thus also this paper concentrates on these 
organized groups and NGOs that participated in the formal policy-process. A focus on a 
smaller-scope subclass of the phenomenon makes the study more effective and precise, 
although broader generalizations perhaps cannot be done (George & Bennett 2005, 78–
79). 
In May 2016, the European Commission (EC) launched a broad consultation process on 
the revision of the Consensus on Development and the EU’s role in the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development. The objective of the consultation was 'to seek views on 
how development policy should respond to the range of landmark 2015 summits and 
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conferences, and also to the rapid changes happening in the world'. This consultation 
process was centred around an online public consultation, held between 30 May 2016 and 
21 August 2016. In addition, the European Commission engaged in more than 20 high-
level policy dialogue meetings with key institutional partners and consultation 
workshops. According to the Commission the views from this broad consultation process 
were used to inform the Commission’s own proposal for a new European Consensus on 
Development. (European Commission 2016b.) In November 2016 the EC gave its report 
and proposal for the Consensus (European Commission 2016c). During the following 
months this proposal was discussed by the EU member states at the Council and by the 
European Parliament. The aim was to agree on a joint text and form a common framework 
for European development policy. In this thesis I have focused on the dialogue between 
the Commission and civil society actors, and thereby the study will be delimited to the 
open consultation process. Thus, the time scope of the thesis is from May to November 
2016.  
The primary data of this paper is based on the contributions given in the online public 
consultation. The data was taken directly from the EC’s Your voice in Europe web page, 
which manages the open consultations and published all the responses. Altogether nearly 
200 contributions were received representing a wide range of stakeholders from the civil 
society, government institutions and public administrations, international organizations, 
universities, the private sector and individual citizens. Contributions came from 54 
different countries in 11 different languages. The length of each response varied roughly 
from 20 to 40 pages. Civil society and individual citizens accounted for more than half of 
the contributions received to the online survey (n=94). 12 responses were given 
anonymously and thus, in total 82 contributions were analysed. It is acknowledged that 
besides online contribution, civil society actors have participated in various ways during 
the consultation process (e.g. high-level policy dialogue meetings with the EC or 
consultation workshops). Yet, it is presumed that these online responses will give good 
illustration of the advocacy targets, self-understanding and positioning of civil society 
organizations and other material might not add much for the image. This idea is supported 
by the fact that many of the civil society groups used shortened versions of these 
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responses in their communication.  
In the analysis I used the logic of Fairclough’s CDA and conducted the analysis in three 
stages. I started by going through the whole set of open consultation responses in order 
to form a good overall picture of the body. However, I soon realized that I needed to 
delimit the data in order to proceed further. Since this kind of detailed textual analysis is 
a form of a qualitative social analysis and as it is quite laborious, it is better to apply it to 
samples of research material rather than large bodies of text (Fairclough 2003, 6). Yet to 
form a better understanding of what kind of actors took part in the process, I also wanted 
to utilize the complete data set. Therefore, I firstly sorted out responses by different types 
and scopes of authorities (see Table 5.2) and secondly mapped the agendas promoted by 
going through selected parts of the online responses of all international and transnational 
NGOs and their networks (see Table 5.3). 
While going through the online contributions, one NGO network was often mentioned 
and used as a reference in other texts. It also seemed that its response was a good 
representative for all the texts as many other respondents were part of this network. 
Therefore, I decided to concentrate on the reactions of this specific NGO network, the 
European confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (Concord). Analysis of the 
whole data set further legitimates this choice. According to Concord’s official web page 
(Concord 2016a) it is an umbrella organization that consists 28 national associations, 20 
international networks and 3 associate members that represent over 2,600 NGOs. 
Concord states that it is a member-led organization and that its members give the strategic 
direction of the confederation. It also states to be the main interlocutor with the EU 
institutions on development policy. To complete Concord’s online consultation response, 
I also analysed its other key reactions towards the Consensus. Consequently, I considered 
it to be more valuable to thoroughly study one, clearly important, NGO network instead 
of analysing and comparing responses from several actors. 
Other key materials I gathered from Concord’s web page by using the time frame from 
May to November 2016 and by selecting the posts related to the Consensus process. From 
these I selected the most relevant ones to represent the dialogue between the EC. This 
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material included a Position paper that highlighted the key tasks for the new European 
Consensus based on Concord’s full response to the online consultation, an article on 2030 
Agenda from Concord steering group members for Policy Coherence and Sustainable 
Development that was published in the Guardian on 21 November, and finally, Concord’s 
first response after the EC had published its proposal for the Consensus on 22 November. 
Thus, the primary data for in-depth discourse analysis will consist: 
1. The online consultation response from Concord (The Response 2016) 
2. The positioning paper (The Position paper 2016) 
3. The Guardian article (The Article 2016) 
4. The first reaction after EC’s proposal (Concord 2016b) 
4.4 Limitations of this thesis 
The road chosen contains certain limitations that should be acknowledged. It could be 
asked what kind of knowledge is produced and how the results can be used. Some critics 
of social constructivism claim that the whole approach is unscientific, and it only presents 
'contingent and changeable stories about reality' since it is based on the idea that meanings 
can be changed (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 175). On the other hand, it is argued that 
certain meaning systems are stable precisely because they are naturalized and the aim of 
discourse analysis is to unmask these taken-for-granted understandings (Jørgensen & 
Phillips 2002, 178). However, it is important to understand that discourse analysis does 
not provide evidence of any underlying truths or actual thoughts of people. Instead it 
shows how certain actors construct arguments and how those statements are located in a 
wider social reality.  
One of the principal claims by interpretivists is that complete objectivity and neutrality 
are impossible to achieve since the researcher always perceives reality from a subjective 
ground (Lamont 2015, 20). It should be acknowledged that social studies are part of the 
reality that they examine. Thus, it is important to bring forward researchers own 
positioning. According to Teun Dijk (1993, 252) particularly critical discourse analysts 
should take an explicit socio-political stance and spell out their point of views and 
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perspectives. It is acknowledged that this study is influenced by the theoretical framework 
adopted and certain presuppositions that have emerged from it. Yet, throughout the 
analysis it is kept in mind that texts are the main source of knowledge and description and 
interpretation is done inductively from them. Thus, everything is written down in the text 
and researcher should not assume things beyond the lines. The premise for using CDA is 
that one has to accept that reality outside the discourse can never be reached, and that the 
object of the analysis therefore is the discourse itself (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 21). 
Also a textual analysis is inevitably selective and there are always particular motivations 
for choosing certain texts and asking certain questions about social events (Fairclough 
2003, 14). Thus CDA requires careful and systematic analysis, self-reflection during the 
research, and distance from the data which are being investigated (Wodak 2011, 52). This 
means that description and interpretation should be kept apart, to enable transparency and 
retroduction of the analysis (Wodak 2011). It should be realized that selected data does 
not give a complete picture of reality, but only serves a particular aspect of it. As 
Fairclough (2003, 16) explains: 
We cannot assume that text in its full actuality can be made transparent through 
applying the categories of a pre-existing analytical framework. What we are able to 
see of the actuality of the text depends upon the perspective from which we approach 
it, including the particular social issues in focus, and the social theory and discourse 
theory we draw upon.  
In this paper global civil society is studied through organized forms of civil society. This 
is a central choice made and it is acknowledged that by focusing social movements or for 
example civil society action in social media, the findings might have been different. Thus, 
it is certain that this kind of research leaves many aspects of social interactions invisible 
to the researcher (Lamont 2015, 82). Yet, it is worth studying the discursive practices 
since it helps to trace the links between language, power and social subjects – and perhaps 
in this case the roles of civil society in global governance. With the help of the analytical 
framework developed here, the aim of this paper is to raise something new from the texts. 
Something that is not obvious and automatically delivered, and thereby to produce new 
systematic, public and worldly knowledge of global civil society.  
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5 THE IMAGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
In this chapter I will unpack the texts and present the key findings of the analysis. Firstly, 
I will look at the whole set of online consultation responses and detail what kind of actors 
participated in this consultation stage and what kind of agendas they promoted. Secondly, 
more detailed critical discourse analysis (CDA) and Fairclough’s three staged framework 
is applied to Concord’s online consultation response and its other key reactions from the 
consultation period. I will focus on subject positioning and identification and analyse how 
Concord sees itself and other civil society actors in the European development 
governance. These social roles and identities I have named as civil society images. In the 
synthesis, I will sum up the findings and reflect them to the broader social practice and 
the theoretical framework. I will show that at least three civil society images can be drawn 
upon the texts and argue that these images are interconnected but also partly contrasting. 
5.1 Analysing the online public consultation contributions 
In the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development - Public Consultation on revising 
the European Consensus on Development online responses are based on the EC’s 
document form. It consists of 1) short introduction of the background, purpose and 
schedule of the Consensus process; and 2) information on the respondents (i.e. may the 
response be published, is respondent registered in EU’s transparency register and its 
number, name of the respondent, type of stakeholder, place of residence, member state or 
other). It is also clarified that all actors 'engaged in activities aimed at influencing the EU 
decision making processes are expected to register in the transparency register'. This 
transparency register is operated jointly by the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, and has been set up 'to answer core questions such as what interests are 
being pursued, by whom and with what budgets' (Transparency register 2017). It is stated 
that responses from the actors who do not belong to the register are treated as individual 
contributions.  
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Rest of the document is divided into five separate sections that are all introduced with a 
short description: 3) Context: why a change is needed, 4) Priorities for our future action: 
what we need to do, 5) Means of implication: how do we get there? 6) Actors: making it 
work together, and 7) Keeping track of progress. In all, 25 open-ended questions were 
asked and in a way online contributions are responses to a request from the EC, and as 
stated at the question form, their explicit purpose was to 'inform the way forward'. 
Therefore, it seems clear that the EC is the one who sets the conversational agenda and 
frames for the dialogue.  
Table 5.1: Respondents in the online public consultation on UN 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and Revising the European Consensus on Development. 
.  
In the EC consultation web page respondents have been listed in separate groups by their 
own selection. Altogether 165 contributions were given, from which 29 were anonymous. 
In table 5.1 all contributions are listed by their category and number of anonymous 
responses within. The table shows that civil society organizations consisted 57% of all 
contributions. In comparison only 12 private sector actors took part in the online 
consultation. This might not give a full picture of the balance of influencing power in EU 
	
1. Citizens and private individuals (23/10) * 
2. Civil Society organizations incl. Non-Governmental Organisation, 
specialised policy organisation, think tank (94/12) 
3. Public Administration and Government Institutions (13/4) 
4. International organizations (6/1) 
5. Universities and academic organizations (8/1) 
6. Private sector or private company (12/1) 
7. Other (9/0) 
*(All contributions/ anonymous contributions) 
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decision-making. Thus, it is relevant also to ask why did so few private sector actors 
participate in the online consultation? Did they have other channels for lobbying and 
influencing the policy-making process? Even though this falls out of the scope of this 
research, the overall picture gives good information about the wider social practice and 
relevance of the open consultation process. 
However, this thesis focuses on the respondents who have identified themselves as civil 
society organizations including non-governmental organisation, specialised policy 
organisation, think tank (see Annex 1 for the whole list of CSO respondents). From the 
analysis I have excluded anonymous contributions, and thus, the number of analysed 
responses was 82. These responses I have categorized as national networks, national 
NGOs, European networks, international networks, research institutes or research 
networks, other regional networks and joint submissions of several NGOs (see Table 5.2). 
As the table shows, NGOs and their networks were the main group of respondents. To 
further analyse these actors, I have used information from the online document and also 
gone through their official web pages to gather more information. 
Table 5.2: Civil society actors contributing in the online public consultation.  
 
20
12
13
18
5
8
3 3
Na#onal	NGOs	
Na#onal	networks	
European	networks	
Interna#onal	NGOs	
Interna#onal	networks	
Research	ins#tutes	or	
research	networks	
Other	regional	networks	
Joint	submissions	of	several	
NGOs	
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From all 82 respondents 13 were members of Concord. Most of the respondents used 
English as the language of dialogue, as more than 90% (n=74) of responses were given 
in English. Contributions from partner countries (non-member states) were more or less 
absent, and only 10% (n=13) responses came from outside the EU. These non-member 
state responses came from USA, Switzerland, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan (n=2), Moldova, 
Japan, South Africa, Lebanon, Israel, Brazil and Nicaragua (n=2). Respondents included 
International NGOs, national NGOs and networks, research institutions and regional 
network. Thus, the group of non-members was highly heterogeneous, and it is difficult to 
make any significant conclusions from it.  
The portion of national NGOs and national networks was bigger than expected, and it 
formed 39% (n=32) of all actors. This group contained 18 nationalities, from which 7 
were outside of the EU. However, many of these national actors were members of 
European or International networks, as for example Katsuhiko Takeda is a Japan branch 
of Care International and Helpage Deutschland is linked to Helpage International. Three 
of the national respondents were members of Concord.  
In this thesis the main focus is on international or transnational NGOs and their networks. 
Separation between European networks, International NGOs and International networks 
is difficult since they are in many ways overlapping. Yet, in this thesis they have been 
categorized according to certain criterion. International NGOs need to have operation in 
several countries worldwide and have a clear origin of one organization. International 
network often works similarly, but consists of separate actors. European network then is 
a coalition of many NGOs focused on European issues, or a separate regional branch of 
International NGO such as International planned parenthood federation European 
network or Caritas Europa. As table 5.2 showed this group consisted 36 responses, and 
thus, 44% of all contributions. Almost all of these responses were given in English 
(n=35). Most of the respondents were from the EU member states, and only two 
respondents announced their place of residence to be outside of the EU: Path International 
(USA) and Care International (Switzerland). Yet, both of them have offices at Brussels. 
In total 58% (n=21) announced their place of residence to be in Belgium. And if also the 
ones that have an advocacy office in Brussels will be counted, the number gets as high as 
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78% (n=28). Most of the respondents (n=31) were registered in the Transparency Register 
of the EU. As many as 31% (n=11) were members of Concord. Thus, it can be concluded, 
that the group of transnational and international NGOs is fairly homogenous, since most 
of them communicated in English, were from a EU member state, present in Brussels and 
registered in the transparency register.  
To see what kind of agendas these organizations promoted, I examined their responses 
for the first question where respondents were asked to indicate the main challenge for the 
future. The structure of open ended questions led respondents to quite freely formulate 
the answer. Thus, environmental NGOs such as Birdlife Europe and Wetlands 
International European Association stressed the value of environment and ecosystem, 
while NGOs such as Plan International and Save the children emphasized the importance 
of the rights of children and young people. Yet, climate change and rising inequality 
seemed to be something that most respondents recognized as a key challenge. Many of 
the respondents also stressed the difficulty to indicate a single key challenge. Instead they 
emphasized policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD) and argue that 
sustainable development goals are all interlinked.  
Table 5.3: Missions and visions of the respondents based on their online responses 
and official webpages. 
 
8
7
6
3
2
2
7
1
Health	&	humanitarian	
Environment	
Faith-based	
Children	&	youth	
Aged	people	
People	with	disabili=es	
Governance	(i.e.	Transparency,	
democracy,	PCSD)	
Other	
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To even better evaluate the respondents I went through their official webpages and the 
way they described their main values, missions and visions. Then I categorized them by 
their main agendas (see Table 5.3). Again categorizing was difficult since many of these 
organizations were involved in several sectors, as for example World Vision is promoting 
rights of children and youth and also based on the Christian Faith. However, I found it 
interesting that so many respondents had religious roots and in this kind of situation the 
respondent was categorised primarily as faith-based. In total 17% (n=6) of these civil 
society groups were based on religious agendas, which almost equals the number of for 
example environmental organizations (n=7). Even though religious background was not 
explicit in their responses and the ways these organizations indicated their main 
challenges, it raises questions of the values that are being promoted. These faith-based 
organizations seem to stress the need of helping “the most vulnerable”, which match the 
ideas of other respondents as well. But do their values conflict with the agendas promoted 
by sexual rights organizations such as European network of International planned 
parenthood federation? In sum, it is easy to conclude that the issues promoted were 
diverse and each organization lobbied their own agendas in the online consultation. This 
resembles the suggestions that reforms advocated by civil society are not self-evidently 
transformative and democratizing, as they can also be conservative in a sense that they 
only aim at advocating their personal interests (Patomäki & Teivainen 2004, 7).  
To better understand how civil society participated in European development governance, 
I wanted to further examine the contributions of one specific NGO network: European 
confederation of Relief and Development NGOs (Concord). This choice was justified in 
the chapter 4.3, but also the overview of the online responses showed that Concord was 
a meaningful actor among the respondents. Besides, its focus on governance issues and 
more general agendas suited well in the purposes of this study. 
5.2 Concord’s reactions during the consultation period 
This subchapter presents more detailed critical discourse analysis (CDA) and 
Fairclough’s three staged framework to Concord’s key reactions from the consultation 
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period. These include the online Response, the Positioning paper, the Article published 
in Guardian and Concord’s first reaction after the EC’s proposal. The analysis was 
conducted in three stages. Firstly, I went through the texts and concentrated on 
vocabulary, grammar and structure of the texts. Secondly, I started to pay attention to the 
discursive practices and the ways specific subject positions of social actors were 
constructed. To do this I utilized the set of key questions to guide my analysis. These 
included specific questions for each analytical tool (see Annex 2, and for complete set 
Fairclough 2003, 191–194).  
As described, discourses are representing particular parts of the world from a particular 
perspective. Thus, in textual analysis discourses can be identified by tracing the main 
themes of the text (main parts of the world) and locating the perspective these themes are 
viewed from. (Fairclough 2003, 129.) Analysis showed that three main civil society 
images can be distinguished: a normative actor defending civic spaces, a governance 
image and a professionalized expert image (see Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.1: Images of civil society based on the CDA. 
 
Norma&ve	actor	
defending	civic	
spaces		
Professionalized	
expert	image	
Governance	
image	
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5.2.1 A normative actor defending civic spaces  
The first civil society image is based on a normative ground and pictures civil society as 
an apolitical and inherently good actor. Various value assumptions indicate that 
normativity and moral aspects are important part of the subject position of civil society. 
Concord is placing itself beyond the other actors (i.e. the EU, states and markets) and 
demanding action with its moral authority. This position is based on the voices of “the 
people” and especially the most marginalized groups. Thus, the legitimation and 
justification comes from the Habermasian logic of public sphere that the author claims to 
represent. 
Throughout the texts several value assumptions and high-level commitments are made 
such as 'how a target is reached is as important as whether it is reached' (the Respond 
2016, 36) and '[p]eople living in poverty matter wherever they live' (the Respond 2016, 
25) or an apt appeal to promote 'fair trade instead of free trade' (The Article 2016). All of 
these statements, are based on values and ideological choices. Concord for example 
argues that: 'inequality of power translates into inequality of wealth, decision-making and 
well-being, which in turn fuels further inequalities and injustice' (The Response 2016, 
17). Regardless of this claim being true nor not, it a clearly build on heavily emotional 
ground.  
Normativity is also linked to the way social subjects are presented and how power is 
introduced in the texts. While making global power structures explicit, it seems that civil 
society does not include itself in these power struggles. The first questions in the EC’s 
online consultation lists a range of key global trends and challenges and advices 
respondents to specify which is the most important one. Concord’s answer starts by: 
The global challenges that the European Commission (EC) highlights – and many 
others – are all interlinked. It is therefore difficult to separate them out and choose a 
‘key’ one. Indeed, CONCORD would argue that it could be dangerous to do so since 
it may serve to obscure the fundamental root causes of many of the symptoms (or 
challenges) the EC cites, namely the power structures that underpin society, the 
economy and global governance. (The Response 2016, 6.) 
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The tone is formal and polite, but it contains strong statements on the global order and its 
defaults. It stresses 'the fundamental root causes' and indicates that economy and global 
governance are related to the power structures of society. It also replaces a word challenge 
used by the EC with a word symptom, which indicates the existence of something else. 
The response continues by: 
CONCORD would like to highlight the global power imbalances at play since they 
have allowed a small number of rich countries, wealthy elites and transnational 
companies to determine the economic system which rules the world and which in 
turn deepens and widens the gaps between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ – be they 
between countries or within any given country. (The Response 2016, 6.) 
This paragraph explicitly indicates 'the global power imbalances' and gives an explanation 
for the so called symptoms. Several contrasting positioning’s of social actors are made, 
and when transitivity (or the representation of social actors) of the texts is analysed it is 
easy to track a certain pattern. Contrasting is often explicit: 'The gap between the rich and 
the poor is spiralling out of control; the richest 1 percent in the world own more wealth 
than everyone else put together' (The Response 2016, 7) and '…between poor host 
countries and the transnational companies that operate in them.' (The Response 2016, 19). 
Thus, a small number of rich countries, wealthy elites and transnational companies are 
linked to those who 'haves'. The poor living in the global South or outside Europe, the 
most marginalised people such as women, children, the disabled and minority groups are 
often referred as those who 'have nots'. These groups are for the most part passivated, 
impersonal and only objects of the action. On the other hand, it is recognized that 
inequalities also exist “within any given country”, and the Article remind that 'sustainable 
development goals aim to end poverty and inequality, not only in faraway countries but 
also at home'. This relates to the principles of new Sustainable development agenda and 
its universality, that stresses the need for all countries to address their own socio-
economic problems (SDGs 2016). From this perspective there is no such thing as a 
developing and a developed country, since all countries have their own development 
problems. 
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In sum, power relations of global governance are made explicit. Yet, the author seems to 
be above them. In the Response word “power” is mentioned 17 times by Concord while 
only once by the EC. Also the word “political” is mentioned 9 times, and it is for example 
stated that delivering the Sustainable Development Goals should not be seen as 'a 
technocratic exercise' since it is 'fundamentally political' (The Response 2016, 17). Power 
is most cases related to ambiguous and impersonal global structures and rules of global 
governance, but also to 'big companies at the top end of the supply chains' (The Response 
2016, 8), 'vested interests of agribusiness, energy or pharmaceutical companies and 
financial sector' (The Response 2016, 17), and to foundations and donors controlling civil 
society (The Response 2016, 28). In the Article the power is positioned in the hands of a 
small group of elite decision-makers as “world leaders” and “European leaders” are the 
ones making decisions and declarations. At the same time certain “segments of society”, 
“most vulnerable and marginalized” are often related to those with less power or 
completely powerless. Civil society itself is not directly mentioned with the word 
“power”, even though Concord clearly is making moral claims of existing global 
governance and demanding change. 
The author uses several nominalizations of itself. A lot of personalized statements such 
as 'CONCORD is worried' or 'CONCORD believes' are made, but the authors also use 
pronoun “we” in several occasions. Different nominalizations are used from the political 
decision-makers as well: the EU, Europe, the European leaders and the EC. The Article 
frequently uses metonymy of “Dear European leaders” which is actually more concrete 
than just “the EU” or “Europe”, but also has a different tone and attitude. The Article puts 
the European Commission, the EU, Europe and European leaders to one side and “we” to 
the other. In comparison, in the online consultation form the EC frequently uses phrases 
such as 'our future actions' and 'what we need to do' while it is clearly referring to 
respondents and the EU itself. But to whom is “we” referring in the Concords behalf? Is 
it strictly referring to the people writing the response? Or a broader group that were 
involved with the drafting process of the text? Or as a reference to the civil society in 
whole? In the extract from the Article it seems to relate to a wider group of citizens and 
refer to European civil society or global civil society: 
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If the 10 priorities listed by the European commission are thought to reflect 
everything the continent needs to do for sustainable development, or that better 
regulation and more growth are the way forward, we should start to worry. We 
should be concerned about Europe’s commitment to sustainable development and 
about its relevance in the world. (The Article 2016.) 
All the texts contain certain storytelling and strong attitudes. Yet, the genres (or the forms 
of action) of the open Response, the Positioning paper and the first reaction are more 
formal compared to the clearly polemic Article. Already the headline Dear European 
leaders, your new plan for ending inequality will not work nicely crystallizes the main 
message. This also relates to the style (or the ways of being) of the texts. As the Response 
and the Positioning papers are humble and diplomatic, even though at the same time 
setting clear demands, the Article is more arrogant. It seems that in the Article civil 
society is positioned further from the European leaders and that small group of decision-
making elite. After all it is stated to be your plan not ours. Instead authors urge world 
leaders to keep to their words and act upon the agreed Sustainable development goals: 
The agenda is not a vision of an unreachable utopia. The wellbeing of all people and 
the future of our planet depend on it. That’s why it shouldn’t be just one more in a 
series of well-meant declarations by world leaders. (The Article 2016.) 
This kind of argumentation is easy to relate to the Gramscian idea of civil society that 
serves as a consent for the state. In the texts many roles and purposes are given for civil 
society, and it is defined as a crucial actor in global development. However, while 
summing up the self-definition of civil society actors, the following extract from the 
Position paper separates civil society (the actor) from civic space (the object): 
[C]ivil society is a crucial actor in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, 
through service delivery, contact with communities, idea generation, and monitoring 
and oversight roles. Civil society is instrumental in defending civic space, promoting 
the rule of law and transparency, ensuring the participation of people and reaching 
the most marginalised and vulnerable people. (The Positioning paper 2016.) 
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Civil society is described as an actor that has certain roles (i.e. deliver services, connect 
the grassroots to the decision-making, generate new ideas and also act as a watchdog 
for government). Then it is continued that civil society also matters since it is defending 
civic space and making the system more transparent and inclusive. Besides, importance 
of partnership, global citizenship and CSO enabling environment are highlighted in the 
Position paper (see Table 5.4). Separating the organized civil society as an actor and 
civic space as an object is an interesting distinction and combines the traditional 
conceptualizations of civil society. Throughout the texts demand for protection of civic 
spaces is one of the main claims. Here I have stressed the plurality of civic spaces, since 
these spaces seems to be located both within the separate nation states and also used as 
a reference to a wider sphere. For example, the Article states that the aim should be 'a 
sustainable Europe that speaks to its citizens', when the civic sphere could mean 
European or global civil society. Demand for defending civic spaces also comes up 
while stressing the importance of “locally-driven participatory tools”, “capacity 
building of partner countries” and “awareness raising and active citizenship”. With 
these arguments authors are not actually demanding more power to themselves, but to 
the grass roots.  
Table 5.4: Concord’s key measures and tools for the Consensus listed in the 
Positioning paper. 
 
 
 
• Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development 
• Human Rights Based Approach  
• The 2030 Agenda is more than a set of Goals  
• Strengthening global peace and justice  
• Effective development cooperation 
• Sustainable development finance  
• Partnerships: partnerships with other actors  
• A new paradigm for economic progress  
• Development education and awareness-raising and 
global citizenship education 
• CSO enabling environment 
• Well-managed migration and human mobility. 
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5.2.2 A governance image 
The second civil society image that emerged from the texts is a so called governance 
image, that sees civil society as a crucial component of a democratic system. This image 
is identifiable by its explicit demands for more governance. Even though there are claims 
for a new economic paradigm, it seems that it is mainly about controlling the private 
sector and arguing for more regulations on global markets by expanding the regime of 
governmentality.  
This governance image stresses the organized forms of civil society excluding other 
conceptualizations from its definition. Concord describes that: '[c]ivil society is diverse. 
It includes farmer organisations, NGOs, associations, diaspora organisations etc.' (the 
Respond 2016, 27–28). EC’s view is even wider but also stresses organized forms. In the 
Consultation Road map (European Commission 2016d) the EC defines that civil society 
organizations and their representative umbrella organizations, include social partners 
(trade unions, employers' associations), private sector actors and business organizations, 
philanthropic organizations and foundations, universities, research institutes and think 
tanks, cultural associations and media. Also other empirical evidences support the 
dominance of organized forms of civil society in the EU governance (Heidbreder 2012). 
The role of EU is highlighted. The importance of its strong leadership is mentioned 
several times and governance discourse is present in all texts. It is stated that governance 
is 'the fourth dimension of sustainable development' besides social, economic and 
environmental dimensions. But what kind of governance is aspired then? The word 
“governance” appears 14 times in the Response and is typically related to decision-
making, democracy and human rights, but also to law enforcement, trade agreements, 
migration and international tax standards. According to the Response governance should 
be accountable, transparent, inclusive and equitable. The EU then is stated to be 'a key 
player at both UN and country levels in promoting human rights, democracy and good 
governance' (The Response 2016, 15). Also words “democracy” and “democratic” have 
several references in the texts. As for governance, also democracy is often mentioned 
together with human rights as a core European value. Besides, democracy is more 
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practically linked to a local civil society participation, rule of law and good governance 
and democratic ownership.  
Democracy, together with human rights, justice and peace are seen as a core values of 
Europe. Thus, the role of whole Europe is seen in normative light, and it is stated the EU 
'should continue to act as a force for good' (The Position paper 2016). This kind of 
language is clearly linked to the idea of EU’s normative power that Manners (2002; 2009) 
has illustrated, and also repeats the language of the EU institutions. The EU is also 
supposed to deliver its values to partner countries, as it is stated in the extraction from 
both the Article and the Response: 
One hopes that the expected new policies will provide comprehensive guidance for 
the coming years. And that they will not only set out how the EU will achieve the 
SDGs and the Paris agreement on climate change, but also how Europe can work 
with and assist other countries to do so around the world. (The Article 2016.)  
The EU can support the creation of local civil society participation, democracy and 
rule of law, thus helping EU partner countries to ensure policy coherence themselves. 
(The Response 2016, 26.) 
Thus, the demand for more governance means expanding “good governance” practices 
and global governance seems to be viewed from the traditional perspective without clear 
linkage to power structures or global injustices. In the Article it is stated that at 'a time 
when Europe is navigating choppy waters, we need real leadership' and that 'the EU 
should be able to ride these waves, provided the European commission president, Jean-
Claude Juncker, and his crew exercise real leadership'. Leadership is expected from the 
EU, and in the texts there are several specific demands for it. It is for example assumed 
that the EU has a responsibility to enable civil society space and even provide its funding. 
It is stated that protecting space for civil society is 'a crucial component of democratic 
system' (The Response 2016, 35) and that the EU can 'play an important facilitating role 
in providing financial support to civil society and local authorities' (The Respond 2016, 
28). The question of financing is brought up several times: 
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In situations where civil society is at risk, the EU is expected to use the full range of 
its diplomatic and financial instruments to make sure that human rights defenders are 
protected and CSOs are in the position to play their role as actors of development, 
reconciliation and conflict prevention. (The Respond 2016, 19.) 
EU Joint Programming should have much greater focus on protecting space for civil 
society as crucial component of democratic system and underpinning sustainable 
development. (The Respond 2016, 35.) 
The EU should support local and international civil society organisations in Europe 
and in partner countries with appropriate and predictable levels of funding. It should 
also work with partner governments to ensure that civil society has the necessary 
enabling environment – including full respect of all civil and political rights - to fulfil 
its functions. Development cooperation must be based on thorough consultation with 
national authorities and a structured dialogue with CSOs. (The Positioning paper 
2016.) 
There are also multiple demands for the Union to better regulate the market economy or 
so called 'international financial architecture' (The Respond 2016, 15). And urge for new 
paradigm for economic progress is explicit. This resembles the Cramscian 
conceptualization of civil society and its main role of altering the power of markets. 
Position paper well summarizes the main message: 
A new paradigm for economic progress: the EU should take this opportunity to 
reflect on what it considers progress to be in the new sustainable development 
context and how that should be measured. It is well accepted that the benefits of 
economic growth do not trickle down to the majority of a population and do not 
benefit everyone equally. GDP is at best a very limited measure of economic 
progress and at worst actually masks rising inequality. The revised Consensus should 
therefore include a more comprehensive notion of economic progress and find 
alternative measures for such progress, which also reflect social and environmental 
costs. The EU must work together with other countries to ensure that, globally, the 
economy is reoriented towards people and planet. (The Positioning paper 2016.) 
The fundamental demand is that 'the economy should be to serve people and the planet, 
not the other way around' (The Respond 2016, 6) and that in its current form profits of 
global economy are 'channelled for the benefit of a few rather than for society and the 
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planet as a whole' (The Response 2016). Concord claims that this is due to the lack of 
regulation at the governance level:  
This trend has been reinforced by the failure to enforce international conventions and 
agreements for the protection of the environment and human rights and by the lack 
of safeguards at all levels to prevent business enterprises from becoming complicit 
in or tacitly benefiting from human rights violations. (The Respond 2016, 6.) 
There are explicit assumptions such as '[t]rade is a driver of poverty reduction and 
greater sustainable development only if it is managed for that purpose' (The Response 
2016, 7). Concord claims that trade and investment agreements are negotiated without 
sufficient parliamentary oversight or public debate, even though they should be based 
on mutual support and public need (The Response 2016, 8). In general, while texts 
demand leadership from the EU at the international and global level there are also 
demands for strong nation states at the local level. Thus, democratic ownership and 
local authorities are seen as parts of the governance system. It is for example stated that 
'[l]ocal authorities play an important role in ensuring the participation of people in 
decisions which concern them at grassroots level and in ensuring that accountability 
becomes a reality' (The Response 2016, 28). It is stressed that at the local level states 
are the main actors and cannot be replaced by markets:  
Private finance cannot, and should not, substitute for the role of governments in their 
obligation to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and to provide basic services. 
Addressing funding gaps at a national level through strengthened and fairer taxation, 
and aid as required, is imperative for universal public service provision. (The 
Response 2016, 17.) 
In heart of the governance image is a strong commitment for change, as there are multiple 
demands for action and reforms. It is stated that '[n]ow actions must speak louder than 
words' (Concord 2016b) and that 'the EU must put these principles into practice rather 
than simply use them as window-dressing for the introduction of its policies' (The 
Response 2016, 14). But it seems that these demands translate into arguments for further 
regulations of global markets and deeper integration of the Union.  
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5.2.3 A professionalized expert image 
The third image of civil society introduces a professionalized expert. Language used is 
full of specialist terms, insider language and jargon of development politics. References 
to many texts and official documents clearly show that the authors are familiar with the 
existing development discourse. This expert image positions civil society as a partner for 
the EU and couples itself with other key stakeholders such as research institutions. The 
expert statements are based on knowledge claims instead of normative assumptions. One 
of the most specific claims within the texts is that the Gross domestic product (GDP) does 
not reflect the well-being of people, and thus is invalid indicator of progress on its own. 
According to the authors there should be more comprehensive notion of economic 
progress and alternative measures to describe it. This kind of argumentations is supported 
by exact numbers and figures as the following extracts show:  
In addition to PCSD, the EU and the Member States need to ensure that development 
policy is supported by all the required means of implementation – both financial and 
non-financial. The Member States should recommit to the target of allocating 0.7 % 
of GNI to ODA, with at least 0.2 % targeted to LDCs. (The Response 2016, 13.) 
Up to 30% of the global seafood catch that arrives on our plates comes from these 
unregulated sources and the UN estimates that illegal fishing strips economies of 
more than USD 23 billion every year, with biggest impact on poorer countries 
without the capacity to monitor and regulate. (The Response 2016, 24.) 
Between 2010 and 2013, developing country economies grew almost twice as much 
as the wages that workers earn, contributing to, but also demonstrating this 
inequality. (The Response 2016, 6.) 
Also the amount of Brussels-based organizations is a clear sign of this expert image. As 
showed in the chapter 5.1. as much as 78% (n=28) of the international and transnational 
groups in the online consultation were present in Brussels. This also match the 
governance image and these two images have a lot in common. Yet, I have separated 
them since they also differ in their language and ways of being. Here civil society is 
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giving advises and specific introductions to the EC, and it can be located further from the 
governance structures.  
However, Concord needed to know when and where to communicate, and also register 
itself in the transparency register in order to be accounted as formal civil society actor. 
Thus, the expert image can also be assessed from the external factors. Is the professional 
language in use, just a consequence of the official decision-making structures? This 
perception is recognized by Trommer (2016) who claims that besides having an 
identification function, speaking expert language can perform a cate-keeping function and 
determinate who can speak and where. This again leads to the question of representation. 
Trommer and Teivainen (2017, 20) have noticed that in transnational contexts non-state 
actors 'avoid offering justifications, claiming that their actions are based on non-
representational mechanisms of participation, which can include reliance on expert 
knowledge'. 
From this perspective, it is interesting to assess if the idea of development differs between 
civil society and the EU. In the texts the notion of development is based on the UN 
Sustainable development goals and word “development” is almost without an exception 
articulated as “sustainable development”. In addition, Concord stresses the governance 
dimension and strongly stresses the importance of policy coherence, or so called “policy 
coherence for sustainable development” (often referred as PCSD). By doing this it argues 
that also trade policy and migration management should be evaluated through 
development principles. 
The revised European Consensus on Development should root EU development 
policy in eliminating poverty and promoting human rights and in achieving the four 
dimensions of sustainable development (social, environmental, economic and 
governance) within planetary boundaries. EU development policy needs to retain a 
strong and independent role. The EU needs to ensure greater coordination, 
cooperation and complementarity of its policies, in order for each policy to perform 
their individual functions. (The Response 2016, 13.) 
This new development discourse is based on the language of the United Nations, and thus 
refers to a wider transformation in development politics. Intertextuality (or included texts 
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and voices) shows that authors are familiar with the development discourse and multiple 
direct and indirect references are made to official documents of the EU and the UN. It 
seems that Concord is fully supporting this view and promoting the change within the 
European development governance as well. At the moment the EU follows the 
development paradigm articulated in the old development Consensus (2005), which 
emphasizes the poverty eradication in developing countries. However, one of the main 
purposes of the whole revising process of the Consensus, and thus the consultation 
process, was to seek views on this Sustainable development agenda, and therefore 
promoting it cannot be taken as transformative. 
Table 5.5: Global civil society discourse. 
 
               IMAGES 
ELEMENTS 
NORMATIVE ACTOR 
DEFENDING CIVIC 
SPACES 
GOVERNANCE IMAGE PROFESSIONALIZED EXPERT IMAGE 
MAIN 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Moral authority, 
apolitical  
Demand for more 
governance and 
regulation  
Expert language, 
knowledge claims  
FUNCTION, PURPOSE To Speak for the marginalized 
A necessary part of 
democratic system 
To bring new ideas and 
know-how 
BASIS OF 
ARGUMENTATION 
Normative, ideological 
claims Pragmatic, efficiency Knowledge, new ideas 
SUBJECT 
POSITIONING Above other actors  
Align with governance 
and the EU and states, 
against markets 
Partner for other actors 
INDEPENDENCY AND 
AUTONOMY Not involved in governance  Part of the system 
Independent, 
autonomous 
REPRESENTATION 
LOGIC 
Represents the people, 
especially the 
marginalized 
Represents the people No representation logic 
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5.3 Synthesis 
In this subchapter I will sum up and critically evaluate the key findings, and reflect them 
to the wider social practise and theoretical framework of the thesis. Are there any 
hegemonic ideas that have impacted the images of civil society? Is the civil society 
discourse establishing, maintaining or changing social relations of power, domination and 
exploitation? While answering these questions, I will also assess the analytical framework 
in whole and indicate possible limitations of it by asking: why these actors participated 
while others did not, and whose voice was not included? And is this a legitimate sample 
of civil society actors after all?  
From the texts I have identified three differing civil society images (see Table 5.5). As 
Fairclough (2003, 128) describes, texts often mix different discourses and set them in 
'dialogical and polemical positions'. Thus, texts might contain conflicting or 
complementing representations of the world. I argue that in many ways these three images 
are overlapping, but they also contain conflicting elements. To understand the civil 
society discourse and to follow CDA it is important to ask what social event and chain of 
events a particular text is part of. What kinds of processes does a text go through before 
it is produced, and what changes does it undergo during those processes? I have illustrated 
the context the whole Consensus process, and the texts are part of the genre chain that 
includes other reforms of making the EU more accountable and open and the EC’s Your 
voice in Europe public consultation web page provides a formal opportunity to influence 
the EC policy-making. According to Heidbreder (2012, 16) the establishment of the 
online consultation system has been the most important policy tool introduced in the 
follow-up of the White Paper and inclusive approach of EU policy-making.  
But how the traditional conceptualizations and images of civil society match the idea of 
open consultation?  While promoting its online consultation process and deliberative 
practices the EC obviously follows the Habermasian conceptualization of global civil 
society. The online consultation is an opportunity for citizens to contribute and in theory 
it makes the open sphere for communication possible. However, more organized and 
professionalized groups have been the standard representatives of civil society due to the 
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demands for expertise and recourses needed in the consultation process (Heidbreder 
2012). The findings of this study supports this claim. When the whole set of online 
responses was mapped, the number of Brussels-based international groups was dominant. 
The fact that consultation was arranged online, did not change the bias in participation. 
Based on the findings and partly due to the chosen scope of research, the dominance of 
organized forms of civil society constructs the civil society discourse and is part of all 
three images. It seems that clear opposition and contestation of states and the EU 
institutions is absent. Moreover, the opposition is directed towards the markets. Similar 
observation has been made by Heidbreder (2012, 10) who claims that professionalization 
limits the participation of less organized activist movements, and thereby the opposition 
to governance structures.  
Since this thesis is focused on organized and civic-consensual modes of civil society, it 
is important to acknowledge that more radical social movements might have constructed 
different kind of images. It might be easier to find resistance from the streets and mass 
demonstrations. Yet, according to Barnett and Duvall (2005a, 22–23) power and 
resistance are mutually implicated, and resistance also generates a taxonomy of 
compulsory, institutional, structural and productive power. Therefore, even those radical 
movements cannot be examined as outsiders of the power structures. Besides 
representativeness and legitimacy of social movements have also been questioned 
(Teivainen 2016; Teivainen & Trommer 2017), and it has been showed that often these 
forms are irrelevant for the political elite and make no difference to the high-level political 
decisions (Caluwaerts & Reuchamp 2015). Dilemma between getting inside the political 
system versus being independent and left outside of the decision-making chambers is 
obvious. However, instead of comparing movements and organizations further, I argue 
that all non-state actors and their normative promises should be evaluated by the same 
criterion as other actors. Next I will critically examine the three civil society images that 
emerged from the texts and together form the civil society discourse. 
The image of normative actor defending civic spaces positions civil society above the 
European leaders and global market injustices by stressing the voice of marginalized. As 
many of the theories of GCS suggested the main power of civil society actors seems to 
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come from their value assumptions and moral authority. Interestingly this image 
combines the conceptualization of Habermasian open space with a Gramscian idea of 
civil society as a contender or a consciousness of the state. In this image civil society sees 
itself as an apolitical actor who gets its legitimacy from the masses. Yet, this taken for 
granted representation of “the people” or “common interest of public” has also been the 
easiest target for criticism (see for example Chandler 2007; Kutay 2012). 
The normative image emphasizes the existence of power structures but does not recognize 
civil society to be part of them since politics is related to the state and intergovernmental 
institutions. Yet, according to Barnett and Duvall (2005a) normativity is a way of using 
power as well, and in the framework of global governance all the actors are part of the 
power relations. Similarly, Stocchetti (2013) argues that the EU combines normative 
power with other forms of power to justify its actions. Thus, it is misleading to position 
civil society above the other actors and take its normativity as free of power. It seems that 
even though seeing itself above the states and the EU, this image does not construct 
significant counter-power or resistance against the governance. The unjust power 
structures of the global order are highlighted, but the image fails to provide real 
alternatives or solutions for replacing it. Instead of taking normativity for granted, norms 
and values should be evaluated from their ideological roots. Now Western values, such 
as democracy, human rights and rule of law, are not questioned by the civil society actors. 
Their ideological foundation is not discussed but taken as a fact. These hegemonic ideas 
can be traced by analysing how difference is characterized in the texts, and the way issues 
are either normalized or openly discussed. The Western ideology and hegemony is 
dominant in the texts, and democracy, human rights and the rule of law are widely 
promoted.  
The governance image then presents civil society as a necessary part of democratic 
governance. It places civil society align with the EU and against the markets. Governance 
in general is presented as a solution to global problems and actors strongly demand greater 
leadership from the EU. This civil society image was somewhat expected and similar 
observations have been made earlier (see Heidbreder 2012; Kohler-Koch 2010a). Yet, the 
strength of the governance image was surprising and more explicit than presupposed. 
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Justification and power for this conceptualization comes from the pragmatic reasoning 
that civil society is a piece of the governance machine, necessary part of its democratic 
essence. This follows the view of Lipschutz (2005a; 2005b) who states that global civil 
society is inherently embedded in the system of governance; thus having also institutional 
power. One of the central arguments is that global markets need to be regulated and 
controlled. Yet, by demanding more regulation civil society is actually reinforcing the 
existing power structures and the very same neoliberal world order that it is criticizing. 
The problem with this image is that it assumed that already by being there civil society 
makes governance more democratic, and thereby issues such as accountability or 
representation are not discussed. 
The professionalized expert image then positions civil society as a partner for the other 
actors. Rather than normative claims the power of this conceptualization comes from 
knowledge and new ideas. The role of civil society is to give advices and to be consulted 
as a partner. Thus, it is not a part of the system as the governance image and not above 
the others as in the normative image. In a way it is more autonomous than the other 
images, but its representation logic is different. In the expert position representation is not 
the main issue. Or as Teivainen and Trommer (2017) describe, it need not to be 
representation of the masses, since bringing new ideas on the table legitimizes one’s 
position. This image does not easily match the traditional conceptualizations of global 
civil society. There are some elements of Habermasian open space and idea of creating 
new ideas, but the stage is not free since to get in one must fill certain criterion. This 
expert image also differs considerably from the normative image, since instead of values, 
argumentation is based on knowledge claims.  
Trommer (2011,123) suggests that even though states are likely to retain their centrality 
in global governance the importance of information and knowledge is increasing. This 
could make the professionalized expert image of civil society even stronger in the future 
and perhaps even dominant part of the civil society discourse. But how to evaluate new 
ideas? Are facts better that values? If all civil society groups are promoting their own 
cases with their own facts and figures, how would they differ from the consultants 
working in the private sector or government offices? As the findings from the whole set 
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of consultation answers showed, the diversity of ideas is enormous and civil society 
organizations were strongly lobbying their own interests. Even though, some issues such 
as concerns for inequality and climate change were widely shared, the results give reasons 
to believe that many of the issues advocated were conflicting and counter-productive. 
One example is agendas advocated by a network based-on catholic faith versus groups 
promoting sexual rights including a right to abortion. This observation is supported by 
recent study on lobbying in Europe that shows how anti-choice organizations have played 
a crucial role in promoting conservative agendas within the EU (Zacharenko 2016). By 
following Foucault, knowledge is not a neutral description of the truth but another form 
of exercising power. Thus, besides clashing issues, I argue that also the values of civil 
society are contrasting. This weakens the strength of so called European values and 
questions the idea of universal values that could be defended by all. 
The biggest difference between the images is their relations towards the EU institutions. 
Especially the normative and expert images are based on the idea of an independent civil 
society and certain autonomous role has been in the heart of traditional conceptualizations 
of civil society. But how independent or autonomous global civil society is from states 
and the EU? It seems that even though all three images locate civil society more or less 
outside the government, the discursive practice is in line with the neoliberal order not 
opposing it. The governance image is maintaining the existing power structures and even 
strengthening them. The context and material recourses naturally matter and have an 
impact on the actions taken. Therefore, it is impossible to evaluate these images without 
taking into account the larger social practice and the structures of European development 
governance. However, the main purpose of this thesis has been to examine the internal 
characteristics and due to the analytical framework chosen I cannot make many 
conclusions from the external factors. Yet, the independency of civil society groups can 
be questioned when it is examined from the perspective of funding. Also Concord is partly 
funded by the Union and actually gets more than half of its yearly budget from the EC 
grant as it is shown in the figure taken from its web page (see Figure 5.2).   
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Figure 5.2: Concord Finances. 
 
 
Taken from Concord website, https://concordeurope.org/who-we-are/  
 
 
Does this compromise the role of civil society as an independent and critical actor? The 
governance image is strongly demanding more leadership and action from the EU. It 
could be suggested that this kind of aspirations are for the benefit of the Union and give 
it a legitimacy to expand its power. Which then gives the EU a good reason to finance 
these organizations. This observation is supported by similar claims by Kutay (2012) who 
suggests that the EU institutions have sponsored civil society actors in Brussels in order 
to reduce 'the EU’s perceive communication deficit'. Arrangement also resembles the 
pessimistic assessment of Kohler-Koch (2010a) who claims that civil society 
participation in the EU level has just been a way to sponsor certain civil society elite. If 
funding is examined from the perspective of a professionalized expert, it can be asked if 
ideas raised by civil society are corrupted by the interests of the EC? 
 
This leads to another important question: whose interests and development global civil 
society is promoting? The question of representativeness seems to be unavoidable. The 
findings of this study show that the voices outside the EU were more or less absent and 
civil society was represented by Western NGOs. All of these images tell, in a way or 
another, what kind of governance, economic relations and society those people “in 
faraway countries” should have. Even though the intentions are well, and perhaps without 
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the voice of civil society groups these people would be even more forgotten. Yet, does 
this actually give these highly professionalized NGOs the legitimacy that they are 
adopting? Does their participation actually make global governance more democratic? 
Civil society might increase the plurality of global governance by bringing new ideas into 
the policy-making. It might make it more accountable if it is measured by the amount of 
discussions and people involved. When participation is used as an indicator, it could be 
argued that civil society strengthens the democracy of global governance. However, the 
representation logics between different images differs significantly and their legitimacy 
can be questioned. Teivainen (2016, 21) states that people should be able to let others to 
speak for them and authorize representatives in cases their own possibilities of being 
heard are limited. It could be that the European governance system makes direct relations 
between represented and representatives difficult as Kohler-Koch (2010b) suggests. This 
might be, and as shown in the analysis the dialogue during the open consultation was 
framed and lead by the EC. Thus, the Union has a significant role in defining what civil 
society is and how it is able to participate. 
In this thesis I have shown that the participation of civil society actors can be described 
through the three images of civil society. But how these different images go together? 
How to combine these diverse roles? Is it impossible to have them all without losing 
anything? From the three images, the normative image seems to be the strongest one, and 
aim to defend civic spaces is a crucial part of the role and identity of global civil society. 
However, the professionalized expert and the governance image are in many ways 
overlapping and together they form a strong discourse that locates global civil society 
inside the political system. It could be difficult to maintain the apolitical normative image 
if the other two get stronger. The analysis shows that global civil society has less of what 
is called direct power, but it would be wrong to think that it would not have any. Through 
its diverse roles global civil society has instrumental, structural and productive power. 
Therefore, it is relevant to discuss its role in global governance. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this paper has been to provide a better understanding of global civil society 
and thereby to examine how civil society actors participate in European development 
governance. More precisely, the focus has been on a particular process of revising the 
European Consensus on Development. The theoretical framework of global governance 
and plural notion of power have provided the opportunity to view civil society 
participation from a critical standpoint and re-evaluate its normative promises. More than 
the effects caused, the purpose has been to further analyse the role of global civil society. 
The analysis showed that civil society discourse is made up of three differing images. 
First, the image of normative actor defending civic spaces locates civil society above 
global markets and the EU and emerges from normative presuppositions. Second, the 
governance image identifies civil society as a crucial component for democracy and 
strongly demands more governance and regulations of global markets. Third, the 
professionalized expert image positions civil society as a partner for other actors and uses 
knowledge as its legitimacy. As the existing literature on European civil society indicated, 
none of these images form a clear resistance or counter-hegemony for the EU, and they 
more or less match the conceptualizations of a collaborator. Thus, this study supports the 
suggestions that civil society participation is rather in line with the neoliberal order than 
opposing it (see for example Lipschutz 2005a). Yet, the strength of governance image 
and demand for more integrated European Union was surprising.  
 
The civil society images differ in how independent and autonomous they are from states, 
the EU institutions and global markets, as well as how they justify their being. Therefore, 
I argue that these images are partly interconnected but also conflicting, thereby blurring 
the role of global civil society. One reason for this confusion is that these civil society 
images do not recognize that civil society already uses power by participating in global 
governance. However, as Foucault (1982, 790) has stated, there is no society without 
power and all actors are in one way or another part of the web of power relations. Also 
Lipschutz (2005b, 754) argues that civil society is inherently a part of the neoliberal 
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system. Thus, even though many theories stress the normative value of the GCS (e.g. 
Kaldor 2003; Keane 2003), it seems misleading to assume that civil society actors 
participating in European development governance would automatically be more moral 
and apolitical than other actors.  
Nevertheless, the question of normativity is not irrelevant. Barnett and Duvall (2005a; 
2005b) remind that analyses of power and governance should include a consideration of 
the normative structures and discourses that generate social identities and capacities. It 
should be acknowledged that discursive power exists and also plays a central role in the 
policies of the EU. In a way, normativity is always present, and comparing arguments 
based on values and facts is somewhat futile. Hence, the difference between so called 
value claims and knowledge claims of civil society actors is not that considerable after 
all. However, I argue that civil society actors are trapped inside their normative claims, 
and to justify their being they should explicitly address their power relations. Since the 
civil society discourse also represents the possible and imagined realities as Fairclough 
(e.g. 2003) has described, besides blurring the conceptualization of global civil society 
on the theoretical level these conflicting images also limit the ground of all future 
possibilities.  
At the beginning of this thesis, I proposed a question of why there are signs of a shrinking 
civic space even though civic participation seems to be valued and supported. I suggest 
that one reason for this shrinking space is the blurred identity of civil society actors and 
conflicting images at the transnational level.  This is not to say that the external factors 
and material resources would not matter at all. Instead, I argue that external factors have 
an impact on the social roles and identification of civil society actors, and issues such as 
funding and opportunities for participation are a necessary part of the conversation. Thus, 
it is not only the compulsory power of donors as Pallas et al. (2014, 1280) seem to think 
but also their productive power as the whole identity of global civil society is adjusting 
to the new governmentality. Therefore, global civil society cannot be truly separated from 
states, intergovernmental organizations or global markets. By defining the EU as a 
normative power promoting European values and global markets as an abstract “financial 
architecture”, global civil society is also constructing itself. 
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In this paper, I have presented diverse images of global civil society by focusing on the 
language used by the civil society actors. Yet, the methodological choices taken and the 
theoretical orientation chosen of course have their limitations. Some of them I have 
already presented and considered in previous chapters (see chapter 4.4 and 5.4). The data 
set chosen does not contain everything that has been said and I have made several choices 
along the way. By making certain selections, I have also contributed in defining civil 
society and its possible roles. In this paper, the focus has been on organized forms of civil 
society. Perhaps civil society images would have been differently emphasized in other 
sources. Alternatively, I could have simply interviewed civil society actors and asked 
directly how they identify themselves and their social roles. This could have given me a 
better insight and knowledge on the self-justifications. Yet, I believe that these pieces of 
discourses that emerged from the texts have given me more valuable information on the 
realities of civil society actors. The findings of this thesis are also more or less align with 
the existing literature on European civil society participation and conceptualizations of 
global civil society (for example Heibreder 2012; Kohler-Koch 2010a; Kutay 2012).  
It should also be stressed that the focus has been on the high-level policy-making and 
these civil society images do not equate the roles and purposes of local civil society 
groups - even though some similarities might be indicated. The value and importance of 
local civil society actors is fairly easy to show and in this paper, I have not evaluated the 
role of these actors. Instead, I have concentrated on transnational civil society groups that 
do not have similar direct connections to the grass roots. These groups are clearly 
defending the local civic spaces and promoting local capacity building by stressing the 
importance of a free and diverse civil society but I argue that their roles and identity differ 
from local civil society. 
In spite of these limitations, and since the aim of this thesis was not to study the effects 
caused but the social roles and identity of global civil society, the analytical framework 
was well-suited for the purpose. By examining the images of civil society, I have been 
able to indicate some of the core problems of civil society participation in European 
development governance. It can be concluded that self-criticism of civil society actors is 
needed. While establishing conflicting images, civil society is losing some of its 
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transformative possibilities and maintaining existing power structures. To prevent the 
civic space from narrowing even more, transnational civil society groups should more 
deeply evaluate their ways of argumentation and relations to states, intergovernmental 
organizations and the private sector. The language in use opens doors but also closes 
them. It limits the imagined possibilities. Supposed moral superiority and over-optimistic 
promises are restricting the real capacity of global civil society and hiding its power 
relations. There is a clear threat that if these conflicting images are not recognized and re-
imagined, the role of global civil society will be diminished. 
The results of this thesis also set questions for further research. I suggest that these 
conflicting images of civil society can be generalized and similar civil society 
participation could be found for example from the context of United Nations decision-
making. Yet to confirm this, civil society participation in that context should be examined 
more carefully. It would also be interesting to see how these images apply to less 
organized forms of civil society and the language of social movements. Even though 
certain criticism has also been directed towards these more independent forms of civil 
society, their identities should be studied more deeply. Thus, instead of just asking how 
to make global governance democratic, accountable, efficient and legitimate, it should be 
asked if global civil society itself could be all that. 
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APPENDICES 
Annex 1: Respondents  
 
List consist 96 contributions that were marked as civil society by the EC, from them 
82 indicated themselves as civil society and 14 something else. Besides 12 were 
anonymous. 
 
1. 11.11.11, Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement  
2. Act alliance to the European union    
3. Age action Ireland 
4. Age international     
5. Alexander Kohnstamm Joep Lange Institute 
6. Arab NGO network for development 
7. Avsi Foundation 
8. Biom ecological movement 
9. Birdlife Europe 
10. Blue link 
11. Bocs Foundation 
12. Care International 
13. Caritas Europa 
14. CDP worldwide Europe ggmbh 
15. Childpact 
16. Christliche initiative romero e.v. 
17. Climate action network Europe 
18. Coalition eau 
19. Concord Europe 
20. Confederatia nationala a sindicatelor din Moldova 
21. Conselho empresarial para o desenvolvimento sustentavel 
22. Cord 
23. Deutsche stiftung weltbevoelkerung DSW 
24. Ecological movement Aleyne Plus 
25. EU cord 
26. European NGOs for sexual and reproductive health and rights population and 
development, Eurongos 
27. European association of research managers and administrators, Earma 
28. European centre for development policy management ecdpm 
29. European partnersip for democracy epd 
30. European peacebuilding lialison office eplo 
31. European youth forum 
32. Fair trade advocacy office 
33. Fern 
34. Foundation max van der stoel 
35. German development institute, gdi 
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36. Globalt focus 
37. Helpage deutschland 
38. Helpage international 
39. Idefie 
40. Instituto rede jubilee sul brasil 
41. Inter-environment wallonie 
42. International disability and development consortium 
43. International planned parenthood federation European network, IPPF  
44. Irish family planning association 
45. Joint submission: global health adv dsw stop aids world vision 
46. Katsuhiko takeda  
47. Light for the world 
48. Link 2007 cooperation in network 
49. Lumos 
50. Medicins sans frontieres advocacy and analysis unit heath access team 
51. Monica Zalaquett Daher 
52. Mrs Valerie Wood-Gainer mbe founder of learn with granma 
53. Nadacia habitat for humanity international 
54. National Alliance of disabled peoples organizations nadpo 
55. National Union of Students of Denmark 
56. Organization of Africa youth 
57. Overseas development institute 
58. Partenariat francais pour leau, French water partnership 
59. Partos 
60. Path 
61. Plan International EU lialison office 
62. Programme Solidarite EAU 
63. Publish what you fund 
64. Rackman center for the advancement of the status of women 
65. Red Cross EU office 
66. Red de muheres afrolationaamericanas afrocaribenas y de la dias pora 
67. Rutgers 
68. Save the Children Internationa 
69. SDG watch 
70. The Finnish NGDO platform to the EU, Kehys 
71. Trade Union development cooperation network 
72. Transparency International 
73. Väestöliitto ry 
74. Wash Sector  
75. Water CSOs joint contribution 
76. Wetlands International European Association 
77. Women in Europe for common future, WECF International 
78. Woord en daad foundation 
79. Working group on migration that forms part of the ladder con sortium 
80. World Vision Brussels EU representation 
81. WWF European Policy Office 
82. Zero Associacao Sistema Terrestre Sustentavel 
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Responds that were categorized as civil society organizations by the EC, but had 
stated to belong another category: 
 
1. Alexandru Osadci Congress of local authorities from Moldova (Other)  
2. Aqua Publica Europea (Other) 
3. Aquaed the International federation of private water operations (Private sector) 
4. Accosiation International des maires francophones(Other) 
5. The European water technology platform, WSSTP (Other) 
6. United Cities and local governments of Africa (Public Administration and 
Government Institution) 
7. SMAT S.p.A. - Paolo Romano - Amministratore Delegato (Other) 
8. Ong centre Europeen de recherché et de prospective politique (Private sector) 
9. Council of European municipalities and regions, CEMR (Private sector) 
10. Europe the European business network for corporate social responsibility, CSR 
(Other) 
11. British Council (Other) 
12. CBM (International organization)  
13. Conference of peripheral maritime regions of Europe, CPMR (Other) 
14. Monica Zimmermann Iclei (Other) 
 
 
Respondents categorized as European network, International network or 
International NGO, and their official web pages: 
 
1. Act alliance to the European union, http://actalliance.eu  
2. Caritas Europa, http://www.caritas.eu  
3. Concord Europe, https://concordeurope.org   
4. EU cord, https://www.eu-cord.org   
5. European NGOs for sexual and reproductive health and rights population and 
development, Eurongos, http://www.eurongos.org/home.html   
6. SDG watch, https://www.sdgwatcheurope.org   
7. Climate action network, http://www.climatenetwork.org   
8. Europe European partnership for democracy, EBD, http://www.epd.eu  
9. European youth forum, http://www.youthforum.org   
10. International planned parenthood federation European network, IPPF, 
http://www.ippfen.org   
11. Light for the world, https://www.light-for-the-world.org   
12. Medecins sans frontieres advocacy and analysis unit heath access team, 
http://www.msf.org   
13. International disability and development consortium, 
https://www.iddcconsortium.net   
14. Trade Union development cooperation network, https://www.ituc-
csi.org/development-cooperation?lang=en   
15. Fern, http://www.fern.org  
16. Save the Children International, https://www.savethechildren.net   
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17. Birdlife Europe, http://www.birdlife.org/europe-and-central-asia   
18. Plan International EU liaison office, https://plan-international.org/european-
union-office  
19. Red Cross EU office, https://redcross.eu/projects?page=1   
20. World Vision Brussels EU representation, http://www.wvi.org/eu   
21. WWF European Policy Office, http://www.wwf.eu   
22. Cord, https://www.cord.org.uk   
23. Helpage international, http://www.helpage.org   
24. Lumos, https://wearelumos.org   
25. Programme Solidarite, EAU, http://www.pseau.org   
26. Care International, http://www.care.org   
27. CDP worldwide Europe, https://www.cdp.net/en  
28. Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org   
29. Women in Europe for common future, WECF, http://www.wecf.eu   
30. International Working group on migration that forms part of the ladder con 
sortium  
31. Fair trade advocacy office, http://www.fairtrade-advocacy.org   
32. Age international, https://www.ageinternational.org.uk   
33. Path, http://www.path.org  
34. Nadacia habitat for humanity international  
35. Publish what you fund, http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org  
36. Wetlands International European Association, https://europe.wetlands.org  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                               80 
 
Annex 2: Key questions to guide analysis. 
(Source: Adapted from Fairclough 2003, 191–194.) 
 
 
Textual 
analysis – 
description 
 
Choice of words, metaphors, storytelling, attitudes, structural emphasis (i.e. headlines) 
Transitivity:  how are social actors represented (activated/passivated, 
personal/impersonal, named/classified, specific/generic)? 
 
Discursive 
practice –
interpretation 
 
Genre (ways of 
acting) 
Is the text situated 
within a genre chain? 
What genres does the 
text draw upon? What 
kind of activity is 
present in the texts 
and representations 
of the events? 
 
Styles (ways of 
being) 
What styles are drawn 
upon the text? Who 
are the main social 
actors and how are 
they represented?  
 
 
Discourses (ways of 
representing) 
What kind of 
discourses can be 
drawn upon the text, 
and how are they 
textured together? Is 
there a significant 
mixing of discourses? 
Commitment 
Modality: How authors 
commit themselves to 
in terms of truth or in 
terms of obligation and 
necessity? 
Evaluation: To what 
values (in terms of what 
is desirable or 
undesirable) do 
authors commit 
themselves?  
 
Assumptions: What 
kind of existential, 
propositional, or value 
assumptions are 
made? What is taken 
for granted? Is there a 
case for seeing any 
assumptions as 
ideological? 
 
Differences 
What characterizes the orientation 
to difference in the text? Which 
(combination) of the following 
scenarios characterize the 
orientation to difference in the text?  
 
a) An openness to, acceptance of, 
recognition of difference; an 
exploration of difference, as in 
‘dialogue’ in the richest sense of the 
term, 
b) an accentuation of difference, 
conflict, polemic, a struggle over 
meaning, norms, power, 
c)  an attempt to resolve or 
overcome difference, or,   
d) a bracketing of difference, a 
focus on commonality, solidarity, or,  
e) consensus, a normalisation and 
acceptance of differences of power 
which brackets or suppresses 
differences of meaning and over 
norms. Intertextuality  
of relevant texts or 
voices, which are 
included and which are 
significantly excluded? 
Are these voices 
attributed or directly 
quoted?  
How are other voices 
textured in relation to 
authorial voice, and in 
relation to each other? 
 
Social 
practice – 
explanation 
 
Social events, genre chains: what social event, and what chain of events, is the text a 
part of? What social practice the event can be referred? Is the text part of a chain of 
texts? How is social event represented? How was the text produced? What is the power 
of this particular text? 
Ideology and hegemony: Are there naturalized representations? Is the discursive 
practice maintaining the social order or challenging it? 
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